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Abstract
This article identifies a previously-ignored pattern of Supreme Court decisions
that privilege one competing constitutional value, either speech or equality, and
subordinate the other—with little or no reasoning explaining its choice. In adjudicating
such cases, including two cases decided last term, the Supreme Court has steadfastly
treated these disputes as either a basic equality case or a simple speech case. This
dichotomy is a problem because once the Court places a case within either a speech or
equality paradigm, it is constrained by certain rigid analytical presumptions. These
presumptions threaten to stunt the analysis and to deprive the Court of the flexibility
necessary to reconcile the competing constitutional commitments. Consequently, a string
of Supreme Court cases have privileged First Amendment interests of speech or
association over equality interests. At times, the Court has not even recognized the
equality dimensions of these cases in part because the equality interests were embedded
in state antidiscrimination laws.
Analyzing a number of key cases including the Boy Scouts and burning cross
cases, I show that, contrary to the Court’s reductive assumptions, these cases are
fundamentally about speech and equality. Rather than artificially force a case into a
speech or equality box, my approach would fuse speech and equality doctrine. After
setting forth a general framework to speech-equality intersections, this Article
reconstructs the analysis of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
to show how a more balanced approach would produce a finer-grained analysis reflective
of a holistic conception of the Constitution.
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I. Introduction
Clashes between speech and equality interests have notoriously fractured “old
‘liberal’ alliances.”1 The majority of academic literature in this area has focused on hate
speech regulation,2 and the issue has polarized, pushing most discourse to the fringes.3
The tendency has been either to slight the Constitution’s commitment to free speech or to
neglect its dedication to equality. Civil libertarians and scholars aligned with them
sometimes have displayed insensitivity to the unique injuries inflicted by hate speech,
overlooked the special status of equality in the Constitution and put forth simplistic and
paternalistic arguments.4 In upholding the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment
1

Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 44 (1992).

2

See Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and
Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1671, 1672, 1713 (2000). Another important focus of equality-speech
literature has been pornography regulation. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1996);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24-28 (1985). As the
Supreme Court has not addressed the clash between speech and equality interests in the
pornography context—it summarily affirmed the Hudnut case without an opinion, see American
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)—
this article does not explore the regulation of pornography.
3

As John Powell adroitly explains, scholars (and judges) tend to view such conflicts through the
prism of an individual worldview favoring either speech or equality. The speech and equality
worldviews are “different and distinct narratives” which are difficult to surmount in part because
people rarely recognize that they are starting from a place that privileges one value or the other.
John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11
(1997). Much of the literature is tainted by this problem, and “there is seldom a serious effort to
consider claims from anything other than the favored framework.” Id. at 13.
4

As Robert Post explains,
In recent years there has been an unfortunate tendency, by no means limited to the
controversy surrounding racist speech, to avoid this difficult work by relying instead on
formulaic invocations of First Amendment “interests” which can be captured in such
conclusory labels as “individual self-fulfillment,” “truth,” “democracy,” and so forth.
These formulas cast an illusion of stability and order over First Amendment
jurisprudence, an illusion that can turn dangerous when it substitutes for serious
engagement with the question of why we really care about protecting freedom of
expression.

Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
267, 278 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]. Although Post refers only to proponents of hate
speech laws, the same applies, in my view, to their civil libertarian opponents. Techniques used
by civil libertarians include assigning their opponents the burden and demanding that they may

2

“often seems to drop out of the analysis . . . .[or] is mentioned only in passing” by these
scholars.5 “Like people with spectacles who often forget they are wearing them, [they]
read the Bill of Rights through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing
how powerfully that lens has refracted what they see.”6 Sweeping proclamations often
made about the First Amendment suggest that it is “the Constitution’s most majestic
guarantee.”7 But such a view tends implicitly to subordinate all other provisions,
including those that represent seminal “constitutional moments,”8 such as the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 In fetishizing the First Amendment and elevating it above the very
amendment that makes it applicable to the states, some critics10 of hate crime laws fail to

regulate only if they can avoid any line-drawing problems and slippery slope concerns, even
though such problems and concerns permeate the law. See Powell, supra note 3, at 15-24. Other
common techniques include the “take the bitter with the sweet” argument, which reminds people
of color of the civil rights-inflected free speech precedent which benefited them, and trite
invocation of First Amendment axioms such as the marketplace of ideas. For good examples of
these arguments, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?
1990 DUKE L. J. 484 (1990). Even deeply reflective works at times tend to privilege implicitly
one value over the other. See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 278 (using the burdenshifting argument in imparting hate speech regulators with the “formidable task” of “carv[ing] out
a new exception to the . . . first amendment”). With respect to the frequently touted marketplace
of ideas, such arguments often fail to understand that “[a]ssaultive racial speech . . . . is
experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue
will follow. Racial insults are undeserving of first amendment protection because the perpetrator’s
intention is not to discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim.” Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J.
431, 452 (1990). As discussed further below, whether hateful language is viewed as merely
offensive or as a verbal assault often hinges on whether the individual is an insider or an outsider.
5

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1136 (1991)
[hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights].

6

Id. at 1137.

7

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (1988); see also Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (referring to the “preferred place given in our scheme to the
great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment”); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (describing free speech as “the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom”).
8

Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1022 (1984).
9

See Powell, supra note 3, at 21 (“In our legal history, and even today, there is often the
assumption that the First Amendment is the essential amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
is the unessential or epiphenomenal amendment.”).
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recognize that First Amendment analysis inevitably entails balancing of interests,11 and
often accommodates governmental interests that are both less compelling than equality
and that lack equality’s firm footing in the Constitution’s text. State interests in
regulating sexual morality or protecting individual reputation and privacy, for instance,
are thought to be unobjectionable,12 yet governmental attempts to ensure equality are
somehow seen as an illegitimate “special” exception to the First Amendment.13
10

See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL
LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 12-13 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223, 235 (1996). These
scholars tend to downplay the extent to which current First Amendment doctrine involves
balancing of competing interests, including interests that are not constitutional values.
11

See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 792 (“The ‘balancers’ are right in concluding that it is
impossible to escape the task of weighing the competing interests . . . .”); see also Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2356 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Victim’s Story] (“[A]bsolute protection of expression
would render unconstitutional ‘all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and much of criminal
law.’ The need to distinguish protected from unprotected speech is inevitable.”) (quoting
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 270 (1981)).
[T]he First Amendment is not absolute; there are numerous restrictions of ‘free’ speech
which have been found constitutional. For instance, bribes, threats or ‘intimidation’,
fighting words, defamation, criminal solicitation, misleading commercial speech,
advertisement of illegal activities, television and radio advertisements for cigarettes,
advocating the violent overthrow of the government if lawless action is imminent,
obscenity, profane and indecent language, child pornography, attorneys’ public speech
during trials, federally-funded physicians informing clients about the abortion option, and
certain types of labor speech are all subjected to some form of government regulation.
All of these listed ‘exceptions’ are based upon the content of the speech.
Morrison Torrey, Thoughts About Why the First Amendment Operates to Stifle the Freedom and
Equality of a Subordinated Majority, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 25, 28 (1999). But see Hugo
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768, 776 (2001) (attempting to explain First
Amendment doctrine by reference to an absolute bar on laws whose purpose is to punish speech).
12

Cf. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and NameCalling, 17 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 145 (1982) (noting instances where law protects
injuries less substantial than racial equality); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 273-74 (noting
analogy between defamation/invasion of privacy torts and hate speech).
13

See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 278 (“It is a formidable task to carve out a new
exception to the general protection of speech afforded by the armor of first amendment doctrine.”).
I find it curious that scholars often characterize hate speech regulation as dependent on a “new”
exception to the First Amendment doctrine, given that Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding statute proscribing group
libel), predate the cornerstones of the now-dominant wave of expansive First Amendment
protection. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). These latter cases of
course undermined Chaplinsky and Beauharnais (at least to some extent), but the point is that, as

4

On the other hand, in advocating for equality, critical race scholars often have
failed sufficiently to respect the First Amendment and the concomitant need to strike a
balance between the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. Their use of First
Amendment theory and Supreme Court precedent is sometimes so loose and malleable
that an “antisubordination interpretation of the First Amendment”14 itself tends to
subordinate the First Amendment.15

the laws that the Court approved in Beauharnais and Chaplinsky illustrate, hate speech regulation
is hardly contingent on a new exception. Some critical race scholars have similarly erred, in my
view, in urging a new exception for hate speech. See, e.g., Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11,
at 2357 (“Racist speech is best treated as a sui generis category.”). This characterization
unwittingly tacitly supports those who would assign the burden to proponents of hate speech
regulation and overlooks that hate speech should be understood as a subset of an extant category
of unprotected speech, fighting words.
14

Mari J. Matsuda & Charles Lawrence III, Epilogue: Burning Crosses and the R.A.V. Case, in
Mari J. Matsuda, Charles Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw,
Words that Wound 136 (1993).
15

For instance, some critical race scholars endorse international efforts to ban most, if not all,
racist expression, not just face-to-face “fighting words.” See, e.g., Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra
note 11, at 2341 (relying on Article 4 of the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination which criminalizes “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred”) (emphasis added). Despite this sweeping language, Professor Matsuda states: “All
ideas about differences between races are not banned [under the international consensus]. The
definitive elements are discrimination, connection to violence, and messages of inferiority, hatred
or persecution.” Id. at 2348. This is a paradigmatic example of a supposed stopping point that
lacks discernable content. Matsuda’s suggestion that “a belief in intellectual differences between
the races,” id., could not be interpreted to contain an element of “discrimination,” a “connection to
violence” or a “message[] of inferiority” strains credulity. Id. Such efforts to “control racism,” id.
at 2345, rather than merely the most virulent racial epithets, would basically gut the First
Amendment. The failure to see that such proposals strike at the heart of the First Amendment
betrays the lopsided disposition of such scholars. See id. at 2346 (arguing that U.S. resistance to
Article 4 “represents an extreme commitment to the first amendment at the expense of
antidiscrimination goals”). Another aspect of this lopsided approach is the castigation of white
supremacist speech in the most forceful terms in contrast to the failure to see the harm caused by
people of color who attack whites. See id. at 2361-362 (concluding that speech by a “white-hating
nationalist” should be immune because it denotes “a victim’s struggle for self-identity in response
to racism”). For other arguments privileging equality over speech, see Delgado, supra note 12, at
179-80 (arguing that the First Amendment would permit a tort action based on mere insult, such as
calling a black male a “boy,” without requiring a showing of threat or intimidation); Powell, supra
note 3, at 29-30 (discussing Charles Lawrence’s scholarship) (“[Lawrence] argues that it is not
only appropriate to balance free speech and equality, but also that equality must prevail.”); Torrey,
supra note 11, at 34 (asserting that in balancing the First Amendment against the Fourteenth,
“clearly the latter should prevail”). Although I am critical of scholars such as Professor Matsuda, I
do not mean to detract from their important contributions to hate speech discourse. Indeed, in
various respects, I rely on her seminal insights.

5

In this article, I focus on how the Supreme Court has mistreated equality-speech
intersections, although I do so against the background of the voluminous scholarly
literature on hate speech. The Supreme Court’s analysis in key freedom of association
and hate speech cases has been at least as lopsided as the scholarly discussion. As I
demonstrate in the next section, there is a general trend in which the Court has treated
disputes that implicate complex speech-equality intersections as simple speech cases.
Conversely, at other times, the Court has reduced an intricate speech-equality intersection
to a basic equality case. Rather than seeking a proportionate balance between these two
constitutional imperatives, the Court has often either overlooked one interest entirely or
addressed that countervailing interest in a curt, dismissive fashion. In a few keys cases,
which I examine in detail below, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul16 and Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale,17 the Court essentially sided with the civil libertarian camp, in that it privileged
speech over equality. I demonstrate how the Court neglected the countervailing equality
interests in each of these cases. I show that the Court has not embraced its obligation to
interpret the Constitution as a whole and construe its provisions with sufficient flexibly
so that the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment can coexist harmoniously.
This article attempts to create a greater awareness of this unfortunate trend and
begin to articulate a method that affords respect to both constitutional interests,
reconciling the First Amendment with “the massive transformation brought about by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”18 The Court’s recent, and in various respects surprising,
decision in Virginia v. Black, as well as Justice Thomas’ striking statement at oral
16

505 U.S. 377 (1992).

17

530 U.S. 640 (2000).

18

Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1152; see also Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 821 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste] (“[T]he Equal

6

argument, provides a fresh and rich opportunity to revisit the issue of hate speech and,
importantly, to situate it within a broader analysis of equality-speech conflicts. The
proportionate approach to speech-equality intersections, which I sketch out below,
addresses important concerns beyond the narrow issue of hate speech. It offers guidance
to courts negotiating the thicket of intersectionalities in general, including the various
speech-equality intersections discussed herein.
In Part II, I discuss as background a number of areas of the law in which speech
and equality have intersected, and I identify the Court’s pattern in which one
constitutional value is privileged and the other subordinated with little or no reasoning
explaining that choice. In Part III, I articulate an alternative to the Court’s lopsided
approach to equality-speech intersections. Drawing on the better insights from the
critical race and civil libertarians literature, as well as the few scholars who have
attempted to chart a middle course,19 I develop a proportionate approach to equalityspeech conflicts.
The proportionate approach requires paying close attention to context and history,
being cognizant of unconscious tendencies to privilege one value over the other and
unpacking interests that the Court has slighted. Under this approach, one key conclusion,
I argue, is that state equality-based laws—which in advancing equality sometimes
interfere with speech interests—should generally be understood as first cousins to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly grants Congress the power to enforce
the Constitution’s commitment to equality. Although state equality-based laws do not

Protection Clause was originally conceived as an effort to counteract the disproportionate
subjection of black people to private and public violence.”).
19

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L. J.
2411, 2449 (1997); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 873 (1993); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4.

7

have the explicit textual imprimatur of Section 5, such laws complement Section 5 and
are integral to a full effectuation of the equality commitment embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. A proportionate, evenhanded approach to resolving equality-speech
disputes would treat such laws with care and sensitivity, paying close attention to context
and history, instead of brusquely overriding state laws whenever they are said to impede
speech interests.
Part IV then fleshes out the differences between the lopsided and proportionate
approaches by critiquing two important equality-speech cases, Boy Scouts and R.A.V. I
trace how a number of the Court’s arguments in these cases overlooked equal protection
considerations and demonstrate how the cases would be analyzed under the proportionate
approach. In some cases, a proportionate approach would make a critical difference—
R.A.V., for instance, would come out differently, in my view. In other instances, such as
the Boy Scouts case, the outcome may not be as clear-cut, given factual aspects that the
Court chose not to explore.20 At a minimum, however, if the Court had employed the
proportionate approach, it would have produced reasoning more credible than that in Boy
Scouts. The Boys Scouts majority opinion not only misunderstands gay people but also
does violence to antidiscrimination law. Contrary to precedent, it essentially transforms
the right to free association into a “free pass out of antidiscrimination laws.”21 This
section concludes by looking at Virginia v. Black, the recent case concerning the
regulation of cross burning. Black suggests a fundamental shift in the Court’s approach
to equality-speech intersections and moves the Court closer to the proportionate
approach. Part V provides a conclusion.

20

See infra Part IV.

21

Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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II. Identifying the Supreme Court’s Lopsided Approach to Equality-Speech
Intersections
Despite the overwhelming scholarly focus on hate speech, potential conflict
between equality and speech exists in various other areas of the law, including the
regulation of employment and places of public accommodation. Although speech and
equality clashes may be most important when someone’s job and livelihood is at stake,
the Court has barely recognized the strong conflict that exists. Most notably, although it
has repeatedly applied and enforced sexual harassment law,22 it has not fully explained
how laws that monitor the sexual content of speech can coexist with the First
Amendment. Although the R.A.V. decision suggested, with minimal analysis, that sexual
harassment law is consistent with the First Amendment,23 Justice Thomas subsequently
argued that the very same analysis called into question sexual harassment law.24 Justice
Thomas’ argument shows that the Court’s failure to engage the complex relationship
between equality and speech implicated by sexual harassment laws has cast a pall over
the constitutionality of such laws.
In a Title VII case that did not involve a sexual harassment claim, Hishon v. King
& Spalding,25 a prominent corporate law firm asserted that the First Amendment
protected its decision to deny a female attorney membership as a firm partner in violation
of Title VII.26 The Court rejected this argument, summarily announcing that “[t]here is
no constitutional right . . . to discriminate.”27 Although the Court correctly concluded

22

See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

23

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1992).

24

See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

25

467 U.S. 69 (1984).

26

See id. at 78.

27

Id.

9

that admitting a woman partner would not impair the firm’s ability to express any
message,28 this finding did not address the freedom of association component of the
firm’s argument. In the end, the Court’s dismissive treatment of the First Amendment
argument—a full three sentences—denied the force of the argument29 and erroneously
suggested that the tension between equality and speech was entirely illusory.
Just as cursory was the Court’s analysis in an education case Runyon v.
McCrary,30 which dealt with discriminatory private schools. Holding that 42 U.S.C. §
1981 bars private racial discrimination in contracting, the Court applied the statute to
private schools that excluded students on the basis of race.31 This construction of the
statute, the Court announced, did not violate the First Amendment.32 The Court claimed
to assume that “parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and
that the children have an equal right to attend such institutions.”33 Nonetheless, it
endorsed the lower court’s finding that “‘there is no showing that discontinuance of (the)
discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools
of any ideas or dogma.’”34 Simply announcing that “‘the Constitution places no value on
discrimination . . . it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections,’”35
28

See id.

29

Just two terms later, the Court stated: “There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).

30

427 U.S. 160 (1976).

31

See id. at 172; see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that denial
of charitable tax deduction to religious college that practiced racial discrimination did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause).

32

See id. at 176.

33

Id.

34

Id. (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (1975)) (emphasis added).

35

Id. at 161 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
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the Court chose to ignore the difficult cases raised by a construction of Section 1981 that
could, say, bar a family from considering race in choosing a live-in babysitter, thereby
intruding on considerable associational interests.36
The Court thus failed candidly to acknowledge that there was an impingement on
the schools’ speech interest (its desire to teach segregation), even though the state
imposed the burden indirectly through mandating the admission of students of color
rather than directly dictating curriculum. Of course, there was a strong argument that the
equality interest should have trumped in the end, in light of Brown v. Board of
Education’s affirmation of the importance of education and the school’s general lack of
selectivity and quasi-public nature.37 But the Court’s cursory analysis did not bother to
reach this far. Instead, it rested upon the claim that forcing schools to admit children of
color would not make it more difficult for them to “promote the belief that racial
segregation is desirable,”38 which is utterly implausible. It is hard to imagine that the
Court actually expected white teachers to promote the inferiority of black children with
those very children sitting right in front of them, thereby directly inflicting the stigmatic
injury at the heart of Brown.
Just last Term, the Court, in another education case, addressed a speech-equality
intersection in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious
admissions policy.39 The Court held that in light of a university’s First Amendment

36

See id. at 187-88 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 212 (White, J., dissenting) (“As the associational
or contractual relationships become more private, the pressures to hold s[ection] 1981 inapplicable to them
will increase.”). Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (“[T]he formation and preservation of
certain kinds of highly personal relationships [enjoy] a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified
interference by the State.”).
37

Cf. 427 U.S. at 173 n.10.

38

Id. at 176.

39

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2343 (2003).
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interest in academic freedom, law schools have a compelling interest in obtaining a
diverse student body.40 The Court approved the University of Michigan Law School’s
flexible, individualized admissions process, which considers race as one of many factors,
but in a companion case, the Court invalidated a rigid, points-based system used by the
university’s undergraduate college.41 In this context, the Court found that the speech and
equality interests were complementary, not in conflict: the First Amendment interest of
academic freedom enabled the law school to decide to consider race in furtherance of an
admissions policy seeking educational diversity.42 Again, the Court’s approach was
somewhat lopsided; it told us plenty about equality, but precious little about speech, even
though the speech interest may explain the Court’s deference to the university, an integral
aspect of the Court’s holding. The Grutter Court’s First Amendment analysis came off as
a hazy afterthought. It did not explain how the scattered precedent suggestive of a First
Amendment academic freedom interest applied to the case at hand, given the largely
inapposite facts of the prior cases.43 Nor did it make any attempt to sketch the metes and
bounds of this new constitutional interest. As Justice Thomas aptly demonstrated,44 this
new interest in academic freedom could be used to the detriment of people of color unless
it is some sort of one-way “ratchet” that can help, but not hurt, racial minorities.45
Further, could an institution use its First Amendment right to promote diversity within its

40

See id. at 2338-2342.

41

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411(2003).

42

See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.

43

See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

44

See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2356-57 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

45

Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (interpreting Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to permit Congress to enforce and define the equal protection guarantee,
but not to “dilute” it).
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walls to justify hate speech regulation?46 Grutter inadvertently raises this question but
provides remarkably little insight on speech-equality intersections.47
Finally, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
which the Court treated as a simple affirmative action case, the Court adopted a rationale
arguably at odds with the Court’s First Amendment doctrine. The FCC justified its
policies giving preferential treatment to people of color in the acquiring of broadcast
media licenses by arguing that the policies would create more diverse content, a public
benefit.48 The Court endorsed the value of broadcast diversity and found that the FCC
policies were suitably tailored to achieve this goal.49 In so doing, the Court failed to
consider that a governmental preference for particular speakers50 or particular diverse
content could be understood as content-based regulation.51 Content-based regulation, the
Court has said on numerous occasions, presumptively violates the First Amendment.52

46

Cf. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 276-77 (discussing policy of Mount Holyoke College,
which “seeks to inculcate the value of diversity, which it views as plainly inconsistent with racist
expression”). Under this scenario, the posited First Amendment interest would threaten to turn the
Amendment upon itself, using academic freedom potentially to undermine core free speech values.
47

Additionally, Grutter adds another layer of contradiction to this already-muddled area of the law in that
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion appears to repudiate the anti-diversity argument she made in dissent in
Metro Broadcasting. See 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by, Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (“The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a
compelling interest.”); id. at 617 (decrying the government’s “equating race with [particular] thoughts and
behavior” as “resting . . . on stereotyping” ). It at least requires some explanation as to why diversity is a
compelling interest and relying on race to foster diversity is permissible in one First Amendment context
(academic freedom) but not another (broadcasting).
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See id. at 568.
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See id. at 567-69.
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See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1984); Roberts, 468 U.S. at
633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A ban on specific
group voices on public affairs violates the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment—that
citizens, not the government, control the content of public discussion.”).
51

Justice O’Connor tentatively raised this argument. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 617 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“The FCC’s extension of the asserted interest in diversity of views in these cases presents, at
the very least, an unsettled First Amendment issue. . . . [T]he Court has never upheld a broadcasting
measure designed to amplify a distinct set of views or the views of a particular class of speakers.”).
52

See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Equality and the right to associate have also
intersected in the voting context. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944) (holding
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The aforementioned cases, in particular Runyon, demonstrate how the Court’s
failure fully to resolve speech-equality intersections and firmly justify its conclusions
have made the law in this area fragile and somewhat contradictory. Accordingly, it was
easy for the Boy Scouts Court to rule against an excluded minority without even citing
and distinguishing Runyon. The Runyon Court refused to see the impairment of the
private school’s expressive interest in inculcating the value of segregation, whereas as
discussed more fully below, the Boy Scouts Court bent over backwards to defer to the
Boy Scouts’ effort to preserve its professed anti-homosexuality agenda.
III. The Proportionate Approach to Speech-Equality Intersections
Unlike the Supreme Court’s lopsided analysis in the aforementioned cases, the
proportionate approach provides a holistic framework that strives to harmonize diverse
components of the Constitution and consistently recognize and effectuate the
commitments underlying each provision. In contrast to the Court’s lopsided, inadvertent
approach to equality-speech intersections, the proportionate approach requires being
cognizant of unconscious tendencies to privilege one constitutional commitment over
another. It would preclude the adjudication of a case like R.A.V. without even
considering the Court’s equal protection case law. That is, it would not permit treating a
case implicating a speech-equality intersection as a simple speech case. As I will
demonstrate below, the Court, in cases like R.A.V., failed to recognize that the
Fourteenth Amendment, inasmuch as it was ratified after the First Amendment, may
require different outcomes and applications of general speech principles when a law

that political parties, which asserted that they were private associations, were state actors and thus
their racial discrimination violated the Fifteenth Amendment); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial
Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1209 (2003).
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addresses discrimination against groups such as people of color and women.53 Equal
protection law generally permits government to redress harm based on its own unequal
treatment of suspect or quasi-suspect classes, including those discriminated against based
on race, gender and religion. Extrapolating from this basic equal protection principle,
Justice Brennan in Roberts v. United States Jaycees premised the Court’s holding that the
state could require the Jaycees to admit women members on the “special harms distinct
from their communicative impact” caused by private “invidious discrimination.”54
In R.A.V., where the Court considered whether the City of St. Paul, Minnesota
could ban cross burning, the Court flipped Justice Brennan’s conclusion. The special
nature of discrimination against people of color, women and religious minorities—the
very basis for treating them as suspect or quasi-suspect classes under the Equal Protection
Clause—proved that the hate speech ordinance was aimed at a “distinctive idea,”55 which
made the ordinance especially vulnerable from a First Amendment perspective. In
setting the First and Fourteenth Amendments at cross-purposes, the R.A.V. Court not
only disregarded Roberts, but it neglected its obligation to harmonize the various parts of
the Constitution. In contrast, the proportionate approach aims to afford equivalent
respect and legitimacy to each of the competing constitutional provisions. A critical goal
53

Compare with Abner Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2000)
(arguing that the First Amendment should be interpreted to permit government considerable
flexibility in expressing government viewpoints and subsidizing expression, except that the
government may not “further ghettoiz[e] a discrete and insular minority”).
54

468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (emphasis added).

55

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992). The Virginia Supreme Court, applying R.A.V.,
performed a similar feat:
[C]onsidering the historical and current context of cross burning, and
the statute’s reliance on such context for the provision of an inference
of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross, it is clear
that the Commonwealth’s interest in enacting the cross burning statute
is related to the suppression of free expression as well.
Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 775 (Va. 2001). Remarkably, the “virulent” nature of the burning cross
provided the basis for its constitutional protection. Id.
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of this careful balancing is to preserve the pluralism and diversity of society, a First
Amendment and equality interest. To demonstrate, consider whether a state university
should permit a law student group such as BLSA to exist and restrict membership to
African-Americans. An unequivocal (and formal) application of equality principles
would require nondiscrimination even if the practical effect were to dilute the
organization’s ability to promote solely the interests of African-American law students.
Diluting or banning organizations such as BLSA, however, also diminishes a First
Amendment interest in that it reduces the variety among organizations in a society that
values pluralism and the attendant diversity of group expression. Consequently, equality
and speech interests both ask us to strike a balance.
Second, the proportionate approach demands careful attention to context
and history. Brown v. Board of Education is a cornerstone of a context-specific
approach in that there the Court refused to rely on the deceptive formal equality of
the law before it, as it had in Plessy v. Ferguson.56 Even though the law restricted
whites and blacks from interacting, the Court looked to the social meaning of the
law and saw its racially stigmatizing purpose and effect. Similarly, the
proportionate approach eschews resting on abstract generalizations or basic
principles. It delves deeper, requiring a close look at the asserted interests on
each side of the balance to understand which interest is weightier given the facts
of the particular situation.57 Further, the gravity of the individual interests should
56

163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

57

As Justice Breyer stated in explaining his approach in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000):
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally
protected interests in complex ways—the Court has closely scrutinized
the statute’s impact on those interests, but refrained from employing a
simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has
balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the
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be measured in part by contemplating how the law is felt by the particular people
before the court (like the African-American children in Brown). For Supreme
Court Justices, who tend to be isolated in a world of abstractions, “[t]his shift in
perspective requires studying the actual experiences of those groups that have
suffered oppression and heeding the voice of that experience rather than
considering this viewpoint in the abstract.”58
For instance, in the Boy Scouts case, this approach would require a close look at
the impact of the exclusion on James Dale, the homosexual Scout leader ejected from the
Scouts after officials learned of his sexual orientation. But the proportionate approach
does not look only to the “bottom.”59 The Boy Scouts opinion is striking in its utter
failure to consider the impact of the exclusion on Dale, who sued to retain his
membership after ten years of loyal service to the Boy Scouts. On the other side of the
balance, the court must consider how forbidding the Boy Scouts to exclude openly gay
people would impact the organization and its central goals.
Third, as Justice Breyer has cogently pointed out in his First Amendment
opinions,60 when there are competing constitutional interests, each should be examined
carefully and thoughtfully, but a court should not subject one interest to a strict standard,
which essentially puts a thumb on the scale. “[S]trict scrutiny—with its strong

statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon the others. . . .
Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
58

See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1779 n.300 (1993). Judges
should be careful not to “slight the heterogeneity of people of color” and should understand that there is no
single “Black experience,” for example. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1784 (1989).
59

Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2322; see also Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1283 (2002) (discussing various methodological questions raised by looking to the
bottom).

17

presumption against constitutionality—is normally out of place where, as here, important
competing constitutional interests are implicated.”61 Accordingly, I argue, like Justice
Breyer, for applying intermediate scrutiny in such situations. However, Justice Stevens’
dissent in Boy Scouts (which Justice Breyer joined) veered dangerously close to applying
strict scrutiny to the asserted First Amendment interest. His extensive evidentiary
demands, detailed below, are inconsistent with a proportionate approach. In the end,
even under the proportionate approach, Boy Scouts may be a close case. For purposes of
this inquiry, more important than the ultimate outcome is the realization that neither the
dissent’s rigorous analysis nor the majority’s toothless standard constitutes a sufficiently
nuanced approach.
Finally, under the proportionate approach, state antidiscrimination laws should be
understood as first cousins of laws enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which expressly grants Congress the power to enforce the Constitution’s
commitment to equality.62 State equality-based laws “reflect[] the State’s strong
historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access
to publicly available goods and services.”63 It is true that the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically declares that Congress has enforcement power, but does not mention the
states. But neither is the “right of association,” which has formed a basis for many
Supreme Court precedents (including Boy Scouts), mentioned in the text of the First
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See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); Nixon, 528
U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
61

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Compare with Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1202 (arguing that under a holistic
interpretation of the Constitution, the Nineteenth Amendment, although textually referring only to
voting, should be read to invalidate gender discrimination with respect to political rights, such as
jury service).
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Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
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Amendment; it is “derived by implication” from textual rights.64 Nor is the right to equal
protection against the federal government found anywhere in the constitutional text, but
that has not stopped the Court from importing the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality
guarantee into the Fifth.65 Such interpretive moves, which are not at all uncommon, rest
on structural considerations that transcend the details of particular textual provisions
viewed in isolation.
Moreover, although the point is apparently lost on the current Supreme Court
majority, which has arrogated for itself the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
and saddled Congress with a cramped interpretation of the Section 5 power,66 the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment preferred legislative enforcement as the primary means of
protecting equality.67 State power, indeed under some circumstances its duty, 68 to enact
laws to eradicate discrimination can be understood as a derivative of the equal protection
mandate generally, and specifically, Section 5. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment assumed that states were the primary threat to equality. The equal
protection guarantee, by its terms, applies only to the states—not to the federal

64

TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-26, at 1010; see also id. § 12-1, at 785 n.1 (“Freedom of association is
not mentioned in the constitutional text, but it is recognized at least as a derivative safeguard of an
individual’s rights of speech and assembly when exercised in a group.”).
65

See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

66

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 477 (2000).
67

See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett , 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18 at 800.
68

See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (state must “eliminate . . .
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation”); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968) (state that has discriminated has “affirmative duty” to take whatever steps are necessary
to eliminate discrimination “root and branch”); see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 439 (reading Brown to
require “the affirmative disestablishment of societal practices that treat people as members of an inferior or
dependent caste”). Cf. Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507,
538 (1999) (“Bias crime legislation is simply an expression of the greater duty of the state to protect its
vulnerable members.”).
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government. As such, the Fourteenth Amendment requires states not to discriminate.
But in light of their history of maintaining oppression in numerous respects,69 the
Constitution should encourage, if not require, them to do more than simply refrain from
discriminating in the future.70 Equality-based state laws redress “a number of serious
social and personal harms” and secure the state’s interest in “wide participation in
political, economic, and cultural life.”71
Further, voluntary state acknowledgment of the sins of its discriminatory past and
construction of remedies to prevent future discrimination and eradicate the vestiges of
past discrimination are preferable to coercive federal efforts.72 The former approach
directly addresses the problem at its source rather than requiring another level of
government to monitor the states and to impose a solution from on high. Rarely will
federal monitoring reveal a nationwide problem broad and politically compelling enough
to move Congress to enact legislation pursuant to Section 5. Consequently, Congress
may overlook or fail to address low-level and/or regional instances of discrimination.
Relatedly, federal legislation, when it is enacted, is often unduly broad, imprecise and
crudely prophylactic in nature. Such laws raise complicated issues of comity and
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See, e.g., cases cited supra note 68.

70

Hence, Justice Thomas’ assertion that, despite the long history of state discrimination erecting
and facilitating obstacles to African-American progress, such as barring slaves from reading, states
should now simply “‘Do nothing with us!’” is a peculiar understanding of the meaning of
“justice.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2350 (2003) (Thomas , J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Fredrick Douglass).
71

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984). States, of course, could not enforce
conceptions of equality that would violate Supreme Court interpretations of the equality guarantee.
72

The Court’s equal protection and Title VII cases have emphasized the virtues of voluntary
compliance. See, e.g., Johnson v. v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on “this Court’s and Congress’ consistent emphasis on the
value of the voluntary efforts to further the antidiscrimination purposes of Title VII”); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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tailoring with which the Court has famously struggled over the last few years.73 The
Court perceives Section 5 legislation as an accusation of discrimination from one
sovereign to another, a charge it finds deeply troubling.74 In addition, the Court’s
federalism cases are motivated by its desire to keep Congress is its proper place and
preserve for itself the power to interpret the Constitution.75 All of these concerns are
alleviated when states remedy discrimination in the first instance. The same federalism
concerns that have driven the Court to shrink the Congress’ Section 5 powers—
promoting local autonomy and experimentalism, separation of powers and comity
concerns—should at least cause it to hesitate before trampling on state antidiscrimination
laws.
In contrast to many of the Section 5 cases, which of course involved federal
equality-based laws, when a state antidiscrimination law is at issue, the Court can
promote and enhance both local sovereignty and the Constitution’s equality guarantee. In
restricting Congress’ power to regulate discrimination, the Court has cited with approval
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See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003); Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 372-76 (requiring legislation to be congruent and proportional); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel,Protecting the Constitution From the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five
Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1, 11 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions].
74

See Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 73, at 13-14, 16.

75

See id. at 2. The Federalist Justices have also indicated that permitting states to experiment with various
regulatory approaches is preferable to uniform federal regulation. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
264 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Flexibility for experimentation not only permits each state to find the
best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from the experiences and
activities of all the rest. Nothing in the Constitution permits Congress to force the states into a Procrustean
national mold that takes no account of local needs and conditions. That is the antithesis of what the authors
of the Constitution contemplated for our federal system.”). Regardless of what one thinks of this argument
as a basis for restricting federal power, state equality-based laws do considerably contribute to the
deliberative process regarding the regulation of societal discrimination. Several states banned
discrimination in places of public accommodation before the federal government did so, which likely
contributed to the eventual enactment of federal protections. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624; United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (“In 1885, ten years before the United States Supreme
Court put its imprimatur on the ‘separate but equal’ fiction justifying the Jim Crow laws, the legislature of
the State of Minnesota chose a different course, that of ‘full and equal’ privileges [regardless of race].”).
Similarly, the pre-existing state disability discrimination laws helped form the consensus that moved
Congress to pass the Americans with Disability Act. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5
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state laws that address the same goal and has held out hope that groups such as people
with disabilities may obtain relief at the state level.76 In Garrett, for instance, the Court
suggested that the widespread existence of state laws addressing disability discrimination
undercut the need for the federal disability law.77 The Court has not, however, connected
this important function of state law in federalism cases to its speech-equality cases, such
as R.A.V. and Boy Scouts, where, I will argue, the Court greeted state civil rights laws
with antipathy.78 Given that state civil rights laws in general are congruent with the
Fourteenth Amendment and mitigate the “especially knotty issues”79 of separation or
powers and federalism implicated by congressional efforts, such laws should enjoy a
special stature in our constitutional regime. Even if state efforts to advance equality
should not receive the full latitude that a proper interpretation of Section 580 would afford
the federal government, they ought not be hampered by an overreaching interpretation of
the First Amendment that leaves little room for equality, as in R.A.V.81
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See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (relying on the
“severe consequence” of being deprived of protection under state and local antidiscrimination laws);
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)
(declaring that state antidiscrimination laws are “well within the state’s usual power to enact when a
legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination”).
77

See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5 (noting that the states led the way in fighting disability discrimination;
every state had such a law prior to the enactment of the ADA).
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Even when federalism principles are more apparent, the Court’s adherence to respect for state
governments is hardly an unbroken line. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 73, at 2.
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See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (setting forth the proper standard).
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Additionally, many state antidiscrimination laws are sensitive to the constitutional requirement to balance
equality and speech interests. Like Title VII, which exempts small employers with fewer than 15
employees and certain private clubs, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), state laws often mitigate First Amendment
concerns by creating exceptions for truly private organizations. See, e.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5l (West
Supp. 2003) (statute at issue in Boy Scouts) (“Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to
apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private;
nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide
religious or sectarian institution . . . ”); McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771 (interpreting statute at issue in
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IV. The Supreme Court’s Tendency to Privilege Speech over Equality
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees’ Foundational, Balancing Approach
The Court has balanced First Amendment interests against equality interests in a
number of cases involving racial, gender and sexual orientation exclusion. Although the
Court’s early cases, starting with Roberts v. United States Jaycees,82 affirmed the
importance of the Constitution’s equality guarantee and state efforts to effectuate that
guarantee, recent cases have privileged First Amendment interests, thereby subordinating
equality. In privileging speech interests over equality interests and rendering the latter
largely invisible, the Court has fallen prey to a form of First Amendment fetishism
pursuant to which speech presumptively trumps equality. Such a strong First
Amendment presumption, even if generally valid, has no place where the Court is tasked
with balancing speech and equality, both of which are constitutional commitments of the
highest order. It seems the Justices have gotten so wrapped up in the magical elixir of
canonical First Amendment principles that they have at times neglected the application of
such principles to the facts before them, failing to tether their grandiloquent
proclamations to practical reality and the human beings whose lives and liberty rest in the
Justices’ hands. In contrast to this lopsided approach to speech and equality
intersections, a proportionate analysis of the interests on both sides of the balance
requires a detailed, fact-specific examination of each interest and the extent to which
speech interests would be impaired by applying equality-based laws.
In Roberts, the Court assessed whether a state anti-discrimination law that
mandated access for certain statutorily protected groups unconstitutionally trenched upon

Roberts) (“Private associations and organizations those, for example, that are selective in membership are
unaffected by [the statute].”).
82

468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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the First Amendment right of association, and in so doing it laid the foundation for future
cases such as Boy Scouts. The United States Jaycees (“Jaycees”), a non-profit civic
organization formerly called a chamber of commerce, had attempted to revoke the
charters of local chapters in Minnesota that admitted women in violation of the
organization’s bylaws.83 After the Minnesota Department of Human Rights initiated an
investigation of the Jaycees, the Jaycees brought suit in federal court against the state.84
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Roberts Court recognized the
instrumental importance of association to speech. “[A] right to associate for the purpose
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion” is “an indispensable
means of preserving [such] individual liberties.”85 Hence, association is often a
necessary means of accomplishing expressive ends.86
Moreover, the Roberts Court said, “There can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”87 The Roberts Court explained
the primary danger of forced inclusion in the next sentence: “Such a regulation may
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See id. at 614-15.
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See id. at 615.
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Id. at 618; see also id. at 622 (“[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”);
id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Protection of the
association’s right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an
expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of
that voice.”); TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 785 n.1 (“Freedom of association is not mentioned in
the constitutional text, but it is recognized at least as a derivative safeguard of an individual’s
rights of speech and association when exercised in a group.”); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at
294.
86

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180 (2001) (“Groups have resources—in
human capital and money—that a single person lacks.”).
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Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them
together.”88 Therefore, in assessing speech-equality intersections, the harm stems not
from the mere presence of a disfavored individual in the group. If the locus of the harm
were the offense caused by mere presence, presumably every business owner forced by
Title VII to hire African-Americans or women would have a valid First Amendment
claim, but that clearly is not so.89 Instead, the harm of forced inclusion arises from a
governmentally compelled change in the message the association desires to express.
Where an association is not attempting to express a particular message (as is the case
with many businesses), or where the inclusion of an outsider does not impair the group’s
goals or message, there is no legitimate speech-related objection. Just as the First
Amendment usually requires people to tolerate speech that they find offensive, it
normally requires people such as business owners to tolerate the presence of members of
disfavored groups, absent a showing that such presence would unduly impair the
organization’s speech or associational goals.90
The Roberts Court was skeptical that the forced inclusion of women would alter
the Jaycees message, but it ultimately declined to resolve that issue.91 It questioned
whether the inclusion of women truly would change the character of the organization and
thus impair the Jaycees’ speech interest. The Court refused to “indulge in sexual []
stereotyping” and “rel[y] solely” on “unsupported generalizations about the relative
88

Id.
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See id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with
whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State. A
shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.”).
90

See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Roberts).
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interests and perspectives of men and women.”92 It noted: “‘the specific content of most
of the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has nothing to do with sex.”93
The Court went on to conclude that any abridgement of the Jaycees’ speech interest was
justified by the state’s compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination. “[A]cts
of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and
other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to
prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.”94 The
Roberts Court looked closely at both the equality and speech dimensions of the dispute.
Ultimately declining to resolve the question of whether there was any impairment of the
Jaycees’ First Amendment interests, it found that to the extent there was some
impairment, it was too minimal to outweigh the stronger interest in gender equality. The
Court’s close examination of both sides of the balance, recognition of the concrete harms
of gender discrimination as well as the legitimacy of the state’s interest in redressing
them and the Court’s skepticism about stereotypical assumptions established a balanced
and sound, if somewhat ambiguous, framework for future cases.95
B. The Court Departs from the Roberts Framework
In the Boy Scouts and R.A.V. cases, the Court neglected the Constitution’s equal
protection command and departed from the framework established by Roberts. Although
in this section I focus on unpacking the equality aspects of Boy Scouts and R.A.V., I do
91

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-628 (“[E]ven if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental
abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to
accomplish the State’s legitimate purposes.”).
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Id. at 628.
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Id. at 627 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th Cir. 1983)).

94

Id. at 628.
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not mean to suggest that judges should privilege equality. Nor do I mean to suggest that
equality should uniformly or usually trump speech interests. Because the Court’s
opinions in these cases privileged First Amendment analysis, I focus on the interest that
the Court neglected, which in these cases happens to be the equality interest. In doing so,
I accept the core First Amendment principles and precedents, but I conclude that equality
considerations suggest that the Court should trim a few excessive applications of the First
Amendment, such as those in R.A.V. and Boy Scouts.
In discussing equality, I draw on an anti-caste or anti-stratification conception of
constitutional equality similar to that proposed by Cass Sunstein96 and refined by
subsequent scholars.97 This conception of equality requires not mere equality in form but
examines actual societal conditions from a historical perspective. It seeks to eliminate
systematic disadvantages that relegate a specific class of people to perpetual second-class
citizenship.98 It understands that the “Civil War Amendments were based on a wholesale
rejection of the supposed naturalness of racial hierarchy” and instigated “an attack on
racial caste.”99 The Equal Protection Clause’s more general wording, which does not
restrict the Fourteenth Amendment to race, suggests a concern with protecting other
classes to the extent that they are subject to a caste-like system.
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The Court followed this approach in a few brief opinions that relied substantially on Roberts. See New
York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541 (1987).
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See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-29 (1994) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Anticaste Principle]; see also Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
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The current Court majority is often viewed as adhering to a colorblind conception
of equality.100 Complicating this picture is precedent such as Grutter, which departed
from the colorblind ideal in order to create a diverse class of leaders in society, 101 and
Romer,102 which has been understood as a prohibition on state efforts to brand gays and
lesbians as second-class citizens.103 Earlier cases, including Runyon and Hishon, in
which the Court rejected speech interests when they stood in the way of the judicial
project of eliminating the subordinate status of African-Americans and women, also
appear to be animated by anti- caste impulses. These cases, as well as foundational cases
such as Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia,104 militate against an
attempt to explain the Court’s equality jurisprudence by reference to a single conception
of equality.105 Drawing on these extant strands of anti-caste-ism, the proportionate
approach incorporates and extends a thicker understanding of equality than the formal,
colorblind model.
This view of equality is less concerned with the source of a measure, whether that
measure threatens equality or advances it, than the policy’s concrete impact on equality.
In my view, the courts have made too much of the public/private distinction and the
state/federal distinction. Thus, state laws that advance equality should be afforded
100

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
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greater respect, and private wrongs should not be discounted simply because they have
not been blessed by governmental authority. State antidiscrimination laws make an
important contribution to equality that might be overlooked if they are viewed as gardenvariety exercises of the state’s police power. Similarly, in regulating employment, a
critical portal to socioeconomic advancement, Title VII should not be denigrated as a
mere statute that simply regulates private conduct.106 Antidiscrimination laws—federal
and state, constitutional and statutory—work in tandem to regulate the public and the
private and thus instantiate the Constitution’s robust, anti-stratification conception of
equality. Formal labeling and atomistic interpretations of the law, by contrast, often
threaten to obscure the synergistic interconnectedness of antidiscrimination
protections.107 Legislative efforts to advance equality are rooted in the Equal Protection
Clause and, unlike judicial efforts, also enjoy majoritarian support. Although I do not
argue that the aforementioned distinctions (state/federal, public/private)should lose all
legal significance, an approach that looks to personal experience suggests skepticism of
formal demarcations that might elude non-lawyers. The individual who is denied a
promotion, say, or access to an education due to race or gender is unlikely to gain any
comfort from the knowledge that the employer or educational institution is private rather
than public. In short, the nature of the harm suffered (and the effort to redress it) is far
more important than its source. With these prefatory remarks, I now explicate how the
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See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237-1242, 1269 (2001).
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states led the way in fighting disability discrimination, which created a consensus culminating in the ADA);
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jurisprudence); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 1241-42 (identifying Title VII’s impact on the
Romer decision).
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Court’s speech analysis in R.A.V. and Boy Scouts slighted equality, understood from an
anti-caste perspective.
First, in both cases, the Court essentially acted as if the equality interest did not
even exist. Treating the New Jersey antidiscrimination law and the St. Paul hate speech
law as presenting pure speech issues, the Court ignored concurrent developments in its
equal protection jurisprudence that would have shed a very different light on the
legitimacy of the state laws at issue. In erasing the equality interest, the Court
unjustifiably privileged the speech interest. A second but closely related point is that the
Court applied legal standards that were ill suited for harmonizing the speech and equality
interests. In mechanically adopting rigid First Amendment tests that largely
predetermined the outcome in each case,108 the Court deprived itself of the flexibility
necessary to unravel intricate speech-equality intersections. Even where the outcome of a
particular case might be the same under the proportionate approach, as in the Boy Scouts
case, the Boy Scouts majority’s legal standard—which grants exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws on the basis of a mere assertion of a First Amendment defense—
does major violence to equality-based laws. Third, I explore the Court’s
misapprehension of context and show how it produced lopsided equality-speech analysis
in each case.
James Dale became a Boy Scout at eight years old and was by all accounts
“exemplary,” even earning the title of Eagle Scout.109 He went on to become an active
assistant scoutmaster of a troop in New Jersey. He came out of the closet during college
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See Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 785 (“Current free speech law, like current equal protection law, is
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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
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at Rutgers and acknowledged his homosexual orientation during a college seminar that
was covered by the school newspaper.110 When Scout leaders learned of this story, they
sent Dale a letter expelling him from the group because he was a homosexual.111 New
Jersey punished this decision as discrimination in violation of its civil rights laws, and the
Boy Scouts invoked the First Amendment as a defense. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with the Boy Scouts that its expulsion of Dale was protected activity.112 In analyzing the
case, however, the Court essentially proceeded as if it was dealing with a basic speech
case and refused to acknowledge the existence and complexity of Dale’s countervailing
equality interest.
As discussed above, the Roberts Court held that, even assuming an incidental
impairment on the Jaycees’ First Amendment right of association, the application of the
Minnesota antidiscrimination statute to the Jaycees was constitutional because it
furthered a compelling governmental interest, the eradication of discrimination against
women. In striking contrast to Roberts’ effort to obtain a balance between equality and
speech, the Boy Scouts Court refused seriously to engage the case’s equality dimension.
As in Roberts, Dale argued that the state had a compelling interest sufficient to override
any impairment of the Boy Scouts’ speech interest. 113 To say that the Court gave short
shrift to this equality argument would give the Court too much credit. It dismissed the
equality interest in one conclusory sentence. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy
Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
110
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99-699).
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burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association. That being the
case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law.114
Whereas Roberts attempted to reconcile equality and speech, Boy Scouts
eliminated the conflict by mere judicial fiat. The Court did not even pause to tell us the
“state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law” that it was
blithely rejecting. The unarticulated interest can be found by examining the Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence. Just four years earlier, the Court had ruled in favor of
gays and lesbians in a landmark discrimination case. Purporting to apply mere rational
basis scrutiny in Romer v. Evans,115 the Court nonetheless invalidated a Colorado state
constitutional amendment barring all state and local laws and policies against
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court brushed aside plausible
justifications for the amendment as blithely as the Boy Scouts Court would later dismiss
Dale’s equality argument. In Romer, the Court concluded that the real—and
constitutionally forbidden—motive behind the challenged law was “animus.”116 Despite
this momentous precedent, which some constitutional scholars understood as an implicit
form of heightened scrutiny for laws burdening gays and lesbians, or at least a step in that
direction,117 the Boy Scouts Court did not mention Romer and the beefed-up equal
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protection scrutiny that the Court had employed.118 Justice Stevens’ dissent, although
very pro-gay in sentiment, also failed to appreciate Romer.
The Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a sodomy
law that criminalized gay sexual conduct, expressly reinforces Romer’s robustness and
continuing significance for gay equality.119 Romer, in the words of Justice Kennedy, who
wrote both Lawrence and Romer, “serious[ly] ero[ded]” Bowers v. Hardwick, which had
been the cornerstone of efforts to deny gay equality.120 Lawrence, although principally
based on due process rather than equal protection, adds to equality’s momentum, in that
the two constitutional commitments “are linked in important respects” and a decision on
one ground “advances both interests.”121 Somehow the same Court that ruled in favor of
gay and lesbian equality in Romer and Lawrence did not think the equality interest in
Boy Scouts even deserved discussion.122
The Court’s lapse may arise from the case’s superficial similarity to the standard
paradigm of a constitutional claim: A state law was applied in a way that was said to
conflict with the Constitution. Because the Supremacy Clause dictates that state law
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must give way to federal rights,123 the Court may have viewed Boy Scouts as any other
First Amendment case. But the dispute here was considerably more complex, as
discussed more fully below. The antidiscrimination law was no ordinary exercise of the
state’s police power. As argued in Part III, equality-based laws are rooted in the Civil
War Amendments and the constitutional project of eradicating a castelike society.
Because such laws emanate from the equality principles of the Civil War Amendments
and alleviate a number of the constitutional problems created by federal
antidiscrimination regulation, they should be entitled to greater respect than the Court has
afforded them on occasion. At a minimum, the Boy Scouts Court should not have
adjudicated the First Amendment claim without grappling with the countervailing
equality interest.
In order to bolster its erasure of the equality interest, the Boy Scouts Court recast
Roberts’ holding. The Court distinguished Roberts by stating that Roberts had found no
“serious burden[]” on the Jaycees’ right of expressive association.124 But Roberts held no
such thing. Instead, after questioning the extent of impairment, the Roberts Court
assumed that there was an impairment of the expressive interest and went on to hold that
the state had an overriding compelling governmental interest in eliminating
discrimination: “We are persuaded that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members’ associational freedoms.”125 Some
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scholars have understood Roberts as demanding clear evidence of impairment of the
speech interest and definitively concluding that there was no impairment in the case
before it.126 Yet the Court’s tentative language in this passage of its opinion weighs
against such a reading.127
The Roberts majority also may be understood as holding in the alternative that (1)
there was no intrusion on the Jaycees’ speech interests; and (2) to the extent there was an
intrusion, it was justified by a compelling interest.128 Even under this reading, however,
there was no basis for the Court to sever these conclusions and ignore entirely the second
independent holding. There may ultimately be arguable reasons why the Boy Scouts are
different from the Jaycees, as a constitutional matter, or why the interest in protecting
women should be afforded greater weight than the interest in protecting gays and
lesbians, but the Court failed entirely to engage these questions. Whereas the Roberts
majority accepted that antidiscrimination laws “protect[] the State’s citizenry from a
number of serious social and personal harms” by safeguarding “individual dignity [and
ensuring access to] political, economic, and cultural life,”129 the Boy Scouts Court was
indifferent to the equality interests of people such as Dale. The Court privileged speech

interest prompted a sharply worded opinion by Justice O’Connor, who would have resolved the
case by finding that the organization was not sufficiently expressive, and thus concurred in the
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over equality and did so without even a glancing recognition of the importance of
equality. Further, in mischaracterizing Roberts’ holding, the Court diminished an
important precedent for holding that an equality interest could trump a free speech
interest. Boy Scouts thus jettisoned Roberts’ “‘equality-sensitive,’ yet balanced,
framework.”130 Although the Court did not admit to this departure, its analysis shows a
failure to “honestly appl[y] . . . the central components of Roberts.”131
R.A.V. similarly erased equality from the equation. Because the Court has been
most vigilant in policing race and gender discrimination, while gays and lesbians, in light
of Lawrence, are relative newcomers to the constitutional fold, R.A.V.’s equality elision
seems more glaring than Boy Scouts’. The pattern, however, is much the same. Because
of the elaborate structure of the R.A.V. opinion and the considerable extent to which it
restructured First Amendment law, a detailed explanation of R.A.V.’s holdings and
exceptions is necessary to lay the foundation for my critique. I will show that the Court
in R.A.V., as in Boy Scouts, myopically treated the case at hand as if it were simply a
First Amendment case.
The majority opinion in R.A.V. established two key holdings, one laudable and
now uncontroversial, and one extremely contentious. The Court evaluated the St. Paul,
Minnesota Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which stated:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
129
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reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.132

Despite an array of content-neutral statutes that it could have invoked,
the city relied on its bias law to prosecute the petitioner, a teenager who was
charged with burning a cross in the yard of an African-American family that lived
near his home.133 Although the language of the ordinance was unduly broad—
punishing particular expression if it merely “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”134—the R.A.V.
majority accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s “authoritative” narrowing
construction that the ordinance reached only “those expressions that constitute
‘fighting words’ within the meaning of Chaplinsky.”135 In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,136 the Court had upheld a prosecution of a political protestor who
insulted a police officer and in so doing violated a New Hampshire statute
regulating offensive language.137 Instead of revisiting Chaplinsky and the
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Id. at 569. Subsequently, the Court narrowed Chaplinsky in a string of cursory opinions. See
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 29596 (1990) (citing, inter alia, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) and Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)). Chaplinsky remains problematic to the extent it conditions
regulation of speech on the victim’s propensity to fight. Such an approach would appear to grant
greater protection to a boisterous frat boy than a petite woman, an elderly man, or an African-
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question of its continued validity and proper scope, the R.A.V. majority first held,
despite dicta in several prior opinions, that there are limits on the government’s
ability to regulate within a category of speech that the Court had described as
“unprotected.” Such “unprotected” speech is in fact protected, R.A.V. held,
insofar as the common First Amendment tenet prohibiting content and viewpointbased discrimination extends even to such marginal expression.138 Thus, even
with respect to so-called fighting words, “[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.”139 To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would permit
the government to ban, for example, “only those legally obscene works that
contain criticism of the city government.”140
Once the Court aligned the St. Paul ordinance with the myriad content-based laws
that the Court had invalidated, the expected outcome was clear. Before saddling the bias
law with a rigid presumption of constitutional invalidity, however, the Court should have
consulted its equality jurisprudence. There is so little acknowledgement of equality in
R.A.V. that a foreign reader of the majority opinion might not even grasp that the U.S.
Constitution contains an Equal Protection Clause.141 This omission becomes even more
apparent when one considers that Justice Scalia, a textualist, who should have been the

American professional, to the extent such people may be less inclined or able to fight. In essence,
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last to forget that the First Amendment applied to local government only because of the
Fourteenth Amendment, wrote the majority opinion.142
The R.A.V. Court’s conclusion that the ordinance illegitimately singled out race,
gender and religion for protection flies in the face of the manner in which the Court has
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause. As the seminal footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products143 demonstrates, the Court has long assessed the characteristics of
groups in order to determine how rigorously it will scrutinize a law affecting that
group.144 Accordingly, the Court has distinguished traits associated with enduring forms
of discrimination, including racial, gender and religious discrimination, from non-suspect
classifications which burden other economic or social groups, such as unions.145 Title
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See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) (distinguishing
age and disability discrimination from gender discrimination, which “triggers a heightened level of
scrutiny”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny of
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plurality of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination.’”) (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (“Classifying citizens by race, as we have
said, threatens special harms . . . .”); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985) (stating that broad legislative discretion and accompanying presumption of validity “give[]
way . . . when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin”); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (relying on the “unique evils” caused by gender
discrimination); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(distinguishing age discrimination from adverse treatment of groups such as African-Americans,
who have been “subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (distinguishing
classifications in general from racial classifications “in light of the historical fact that the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifications ‘constitutionally
suspect.’”) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
In contrast to the judicial precedent according race and gender suspect/quasi-suspect
status, “‘the text of the First Amendment itself ‘singles out’ religion for special protections.’”
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1, 9). Accordingly, religious
adherents challenging governmental action typically rely on one of the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses, rather than resort to the more general Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the
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VII, which the R.A.V. Court cited with approval in R.A.V., also singles out “race, color,
religion, [and] sex” as prohibited forms of employment discrimination.146 Suspect and
quasi-suspect groups receive special protection in the form of careful judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause in light of a variety of factors including original intent,
political power and immutatability.147 Classifications burdening the remaining groups
are subject to mere rational basis review, meaning of course that the Court almost
invariably upholds them.148 Given that the Court itself had extended special protection to
the very same groups identified in the St. Paul ordinance, and had declined to do so for
other groups such as political parties, how could the R.A.V. Court conclude that the St.
Paul ordinance’s distinctions were illegitimate? In so doing, the Court dismissed and
subordinated the Civil War Amendments and their profound impact on the entire
Constitution, including the First Amendment. The Civil War Amendments, including the
Equal Protection Clause, teach that efforts by government (whether state or federal) to

Court has not squarely had to resolve whether religion is a suspect or quasi-suspect class because
any religion-based government action that would violate the Equal Protection Clause would also
likely violate the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause. Whether viewed as a First
Amendment or equal protection issue, however, the result is the same. Laws that target religion
“trigger[] constitutional concern—and heightened judicial scrutiny.” Id. (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2419 (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause operates as a
super-Equal Protection Clause for classifications.”); Greene, supra note 53, at 11 (“religion is
distinctive, for constitutional purposes”); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument
for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1783 (1996) [hereinafter Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols]. That the special status of religion may be rooted in the First Amendment,
rather than the Fourteenth, only underscores the R.A.V. Court’s narrow vision in disregarding the
Speech Clause’s textual neighbors.
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ensure equality are desirable and consonant with the Constitution—if the document is
interpreted holistically, rather than in a doctrinally segmented fashion.149
R.A.V.’s analytical head-on collision with Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence
is evidenced by the Court’s hypothetical of a law that would be permissible under its
ruling: “We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the way of
a State’s prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.”150
According to the Court, even though it is facially content-based, a law favoring a group
lacking any history of serious discrimination (non-blue-eyed actors) would not give rise
to First Amendment suspicion, while a law protecting African-Americans, women and
religious minorities would be presumptively unconstitutional. The R.A.V. Court thus
erroneously set the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause at crosspurposes.151 Under the Court’s view, the government’s ability to curb expression is at its
apex when it legislates with respect to traits that lack historical and contextual
significance, which stands Equal Protection Clause analysis on its head.152 Recognizing
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Cf. Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1131 (criticizing those who have analyzed the Bill
of Rights as if it were “chopped up into discrete chunks of text, with each bit examined in
isolation”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 802 (arguing that “the free speech
principle can march hand-in-hand with the [Fourteenth Amendment] anticaste principle . . . .
When tension does arise, courts ought to minimize infringements on either principle.”). But see
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (1993).
150

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992). Despite the Court’s use of the term
“actress,” presumably the law would apply to blue-eyed women and men. I assume that the Court
did not mean to suggest that the law would contain a gender classification.
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“[J]urists should resist automatically treating liberty and equality as oppositional goals; their
relationship is far more intricate and complicated than this reductionist approach recognizes.”
Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 96; see also Hunter, supra note 2, at 1719
(“Orthodoxy [a First Amendment concern] and exclusion [an Equal Protection concern] are not,
and need not be, trade-offs. . . .”).
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As Justice O’Connor emphasized in the Court’s landmark affirmative action case, “Context
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003); see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 437
(criticizing an “ahistorical and idealized” approach to First Amendment interpretation); Matsuda,
Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2361 (urging consideration of “the historical context in which
racist speech arises, and attention to the degree of harm experienced by targets of different kinds
of speech”). By contrast, when government seeks to protect groups that do not fit the Carolene
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the equality interest would have led the Court to the conclusion that a law protecting
outgroups is not more problematic than the blue-eyed-actress law; indeed, it is less so,
because only with respect to the former law is there a strong countervailing equality
interest.
In contrast to the broadened prohibition on content-based discrimination, the
Court’s second holding—that the St. Paul ordinance did not fit into any of R.A.V.’s
exceptions to the ban on content-based regulation—provoked bitter disagreement among
the Justices. After the Court announced its new rule, it unveiled several exceptions,
which appeared to be an effort to cabin the effect of the decision and avoid unduly
destabilizing the law. Although in theory the exceptions could have muted the harsh
presumption against content-based discrimination, the majority’s stingy application of the
exceptions again steadfastly ignored equality considerations. The Court suggested that
the exceptions shared a common thread in that regulations promulgated thereunder are
not susceptible to the charge that the government is attempting to drive certain ideas from
the marketplace.153 Delineating its first exception, the majority said “[w]hen the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”154
As examples of permissible legislation under this exception, the Court cited the federal

Products definition of a suspect class, see generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) [hereinafter Post,
Prejudicial Appearances] (discussing local ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on physical
appearance), the constitutional force behind such a law may not be strong enough to withstand a
First Amendment or other constitutional challenge.
153

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1991).

154

Id. at 388.
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statute that prohibits threats of violence against the President155 and an obscenity law that
targets only the most prurient obscenity.156
The second exception allows regulation where a subclass of speech “happens to
be associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech, so that the regulation is
justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech.”157 Therefore, a state could
ban only obscene live performances by minors. Further, Title VII’s “general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices” is not rendered unconstitutional
simply because its ban encompasses “sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other
words” that may produce a Title VII violation.158 “Where the government does not target
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”159 Indicating that
there might be other exceptions that escaped its memory,160 the Court suggested that the
test for assessing any law that did not neatly fit the foregoing exceptions would be
whether there is a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”161 The
Court’s exceptions surely left an ad hoc aftertaste,162 but more problematic than the

155

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
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Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
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Id. at 390.
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Id.
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See id.
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Id.
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In several respects, the Court failed to engage complex questions with respect to why its
examples of permissible regulation were valid exceptions to the rule. For example, why should
the regulatory ban on sexual harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2003), which specifically targets
speech based on its content, be treated as part of a ban on conduct rather than a freestanding
speech ban? Why can’t hate speech bans similarly be viewed as part of a broader regime of
antidiscrimination law (including employment and housing law) aimed at eradicating private
action that effectively excludes women and people of color, among others, from public life? See
Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2335 (“Gutter racism, parlor racism, corporate racism,
and governmental racism work in coordination, reinforcing existing conditions of domination.”);
Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 299 (describing argument that “racist speech ought to be
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exceptions themselves was the way the Court turned a blind eye to the Equal Protection
Clause in applying them.
Remarkably, the Court concluded that the St. Paul ordinance “assuredly” “does
not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on the very reasons why the
particular class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is proscribable.”163 The Court
denied that the ordinance singled out “a particularly intolerable (and socially
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”164 Yet
the ordinance can be understood as exactly such a regulation. It proscribed unusually
threatening symbols, specifically a burning cross or Nazi swastika, while permitting
people to express racist and anti-Semitic ideas in any other mode, including any oral
expression: the ordinance banned only certain physical objects, including signs, placed
on public property.165 The Court’s references to “disfavored subjects”166 are thus vast

characterized as a ‘mechanism of subordination’ within a larger system of suppression, rather than
as a form of communication”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 828 (“[I]f
R.A.V. is right on neutrality, it is not simple to explain why the civil rights laws survive
constitutional attack.”); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Ghettoization
of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993) (arguing that street harassment based on gender should
be a legally cognizable harm). Ironically, in the midst of an opinion that repeatedly privileges
speech and subordinates equality, the Court flipped this paradigm momentarily, giving short shrift
to speech by distinguishing and preserving sexual harassment law with a dubious, skeletal
“secondary effects” argument (which had previously applied only to sexually explicit speech).
The Court never has fully explained how sexual harassment law can coexist harmoniously with
the First Amendment, which has created uncertainty. See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar,
529 U.S. 1138 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that R.A.V.
supports holding sexual harassment laws unconstitutional). The issue of sexual harassment law is
beyond the scope of this article.
163

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393.

164

Id. (emphasis in original).
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The ordinance applied only to a person who “places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika . . . .”
505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). A sign with words on it might
qualify as a “symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti . . . place[d] on public or private
property,” id. at 379, but mere spoken words, intangibles that cannot be “placed” anywhere, likely would
not. Id. at 402. Even if a broader construction of the ordinance is tenable, the courts have an obligation to
interpret a statute to mitigate constitutional problems—not to exacerbate them. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black,
123 S.Ct. 1536, 1557 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “where one
of two possible interpretations of the state statute would clearly render it unconstitutional, and the other
would not . . . we would adopt the alternative reading that renders the statute constitutional rather than

44

exaggerations. They erroneously suggest that the ordinance silenced any discussion on
the subjects of race, religion or gender, or at least silenced one side of the debate, when in
reality the law was a very narrow prohibition on a particular mode of communication that
left open most means of expressing hateful ideas regarding the aforementioned
subjects.167 Moreover, understanding the narrow scope of the ordinance undermines the
Court’s conclusion that the ordinance was intended to suppress particular ideas.168 If that
indeed was St. Paul’s intention, the city pursued its purpose in an extremely attenuated
and ineffectual manner. Hence, the Court’s assertion that the ordinance, as narrowly
construed by the state court, banned “fighting words of whatever manner that
communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance” was hyperbolic.169
Similarly, the Court’s contention that the law did not isolate “only those fighting
words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious)
manner” is difficult to understand from an equality perspective.170 The Court’s belief that

unconstitutional”). Especially in light of the fact that the ordinance’s only specific examples of prohibited
conduct are displaying a burning cross and swastika, both of which are physical objects, a properly narrow
construction of the ordinance would exclude all verbal speech. As the Court noted, St. Paul asserted that
“the ordinance applies only to ‘racial, religious, or gender-specific symbols,’ such as ‘a burning cross, Nazi
swastika or other instrumentality of like import.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (quoting Brief for Respondent 8)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 391 (referring to displays, signs, and placards); id. at 435 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (referring to signs). The Court’s viewpoint discrimination conclusion hence
relies on the rather implausible assumption that a person responding to the insult “all anti-Catholic bigots
are misbegotten” would take the time to find some markers and poster board and respond with a sign, rather
than immediately utter a verbal retort. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92.
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Id. at 391; see also id. at 381.
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Cf. Delgado, supra note 12, at 177 (“[P]rotecting members of racial minorities from injury
through racial insults, and society itself from the accumulated harms of racism, is very different
from prohibiting espousal of the view that race discrimination is proper.”).
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See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393.
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Id. (emphasis added).
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See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 149 (describing this claim as
“incomprehensible and other-worldly” if taken at face value); Powell, supra note 3, at 30 (“Those
in the free speech narrative are extremely reluctant to concede that racist speech is ever any more
than offensive speech. . . .”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 815 (“It is only
obtuseness—a failure of perception or empathetic identification—that would enable someone to
say that the word ‘fascist’ or ‘pig’ produces the same feelings as the word ‘nigger.’ In view of our
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epithets based on race, religion, and gender, such as “nigger,” “kike,” and “cunt”171 are
“merely obnoxious” and not “threatening” ignores the stubborn societal significance of
these traits and their turbulent histories, including the aforementioned epithets.172 The
Court’s argument becomes even more confounding when it attempts to compare racial
discrimination with political affiliation and union membership. African-Americans—not
political partisans—were systematically enslaved—“the ultimate violation of human
dignity.”173 Women—not union members—were denied the right to vote for most of our
constitutional history.174 And Jews were singularly devastated by the Holocaust.175
Further, race, gender and religion, unlike many other traits, are typically “central to one’s
self-image.”176 Only someone oblivious to the sting of virulent discrimination—someone
who had never been called one of the aforementioned epithets—could compare race,
gender and religion177 to political affiliation or union membership.178 The R.A.V.

history, invective directed against minority groups, and racist speech in general, creates fears of
violence and subordination that are not plausibly described as mere offense.”).
171

In using such charged language, I am not unmindful of the risk of “offending by speaking the
upsetting words and phrases.” Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 291. I use such words nonetheless
because it seems to me necessary in order to uncover and grapple with “the real issues” embedded
within the discourse of hate speech regulation. Id.
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See generally RANDALL L. KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME
WORD (2002).
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Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1135-36.
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See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
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See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1781.
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Delgado, supra note 12, at 144.
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The ordinance also applied to fighting words regarding color, but this trait clearly is related to race.
Although the ordinance mentioned “creed” as well, the intended meaning is uncertain. This term may
simply be another reference to religious beliefs, much as color is linked with race. See Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 533 (1986) (defining “creed” as “a brief authoritative doctrinal formula . . .
intended to define what is held by a Christian congregation, synod, or church to be true . . .” and “a
formulation or system of religious faith”). “Creed” has sometimes been used more broadly in a way that
could embrace political belief, but as explained in the text, the R.A.V. Court interpreted the ordinance not
to cover political affiliation.
178

Apparently relying on his own limited experience and viewpoint, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, failed to consider the victim’s perspective. By contrast, in Roberts, Justice Brennan took
note of the virulence of gender discrimination, finding that from the victim’s viewpoint, such
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majority, doggedly resisting context, overlooked the fact that a person discriminated
against based on her race or gender experiences an injury that cuts to the core of her
personhood in a way that an insult imposed on account of her political party or union
affiliation would not.
A second criticism is that in both cases the Court adopted legal standards
incompatible with reconciling speech and equality. The R.A.V. Court erred in subjecting
the equality-based law to harsh and exacting First Amendment scrutiny. The Boy Scouts
Court adopted a legal standard that was different in some respects yet also the same. It
diluted the showing required of a group asserting a First Amendment exemption from
antidiscrimination laws so drastically that the evidentiary burden evanesced. The
ultimate effect of relieving a First Amendment claimant of any cognizable burden is to
hobble equality-based laws by riddling them with exceptions whenever an arguable
conflict with a speech interest is asserted. Although the R.A.V. Court directed its ire at
the St. Paul ordinance and the justifications the city offered in support of it, the Court
simultaneously and discreetly reduced the First Amendment claimant’s burden in finding
viewpoint-based discrimination on the basis of a solitary and rather flimsy hypothetical.
In both cases, therefore, the legal standard was calibrated to privilege speech and
diminish equality.
Despite the R.A.V. Court’s application of a presumption of unconstitutionality, in
light of its exceptions to the ban on content-based regulation, the R.A.V. holding, in the
end, seems to boil down to a determination of legislative motive. As the Court saw it, the

discrimination was sufficiently close to racial discrimination. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-88 (1973)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that gender discrimination is comparable to racial
discrimination).
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ordinance was not simply content-based; it was also viewpoint-based.179 This is a grave
charge, as viewpoint-based laws (when the Court recognizes them as such) are invariably
struck down.180 In general First Amendment cases, “the Court has been ‘reluctant to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible [permissible]
purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute.’”181 In determining whether
viewpoint discrimination is afoot, however, the Court’s willingness to look closely at
legislative motive has varied significantly from case to case.182 On the one hand, in
United States v. O’Brien,183 the Court declined to consider legislative motive. On the
other hand, this refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s emphasis on motive in other
cases, most notably in the flag burning cases, Texas v. Johnson184 and United States v.
Eichman.185 The aggressive approach employed in the flag burning cases was warranted
because the context clearly suggested that viewpoint discrimination was operating,186 the
law served no non-expressive purpose, such as protecting life, liberty or property,187 and
the law was directed at speech critical of the government, the suppression of which
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See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment does not
permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects.”); id. at 395 (“The statements of St. Paul in this very case afford ample basis for, if not
full confirmation of, [the suspicion of official suppression of ideas].”).
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See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 790.
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Id. at 817 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983)).
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See id. at 818-19.
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391 U.S. 367 (1968)
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491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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The federal flag burning law was enacted in the aftermath of the Court’s controversial opinion striking
down a Texas flag burning statute. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314. While the federal law may be viewed as
an attempt to remedy the flaw in the Texas statute, it also evinces an attempt to accomplish the same
unconstitutional purpose in a craftier manner.

187

The statute prohibited private persons from destroying their own private property (a flag), despite the
absence of any tangible non-speech harms arising from that destruction.
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constitutes a unique threat to core First Amendment principles.188 But the Court’s farreaching approach, most clearly demonstrated by Eichman,189 should have no place
where on its face a law protects a vulnerable subset of citizens—rather than the
government itself190—and seeks to redress concrete harms such as a disproportionate
exposure to violence and intimidation.191 Although equality-based laws may impact
speech interests, as argued above, because of their special status under the Equal
Protection Clause, equality-based laws ought to enjoy a presumption that the legislature
enacted them in good faith.192 These cases show that the presence of a First Amendment
claim in R.A.V. did not ineluctably lead the Court to apply an exacting legal standard.
The Court was faced with a choice, and it selected the most daunting First Amendment
standard—one that left little room for accommodating equality. Even the Court’s
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See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415. Justice Ginsburg made this point during oral argument in Virginia
v. Black. See Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack By Justice Thomas on Cross Burning, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2002, at A1 (“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg objected that there was a ‘big difference’ between
[flag burning and cross burning]. ‘The flag is a symbol of the government.’ But burning a cross means
‘attacking people, threatening life and limb,’ she said.”). Despite this distinction, Justice Ginsburg
ultimately dissented in Black.
189

In Johnson, a viewpoint preference appeared on the face of the Texas statute in that it banned
desecration “meant to ‘deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.’” Eichman, 496 U.S. at 313
(quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989)). By contrast, in Eichman, “the Flag Protection Act
contain[ed] no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct,” id. at 315, and it took
more work for the Court to uncover the viewpoint bias at the heart of the statute.
190

Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (distinguishing the fighting words doctrine because “[n]o
reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with
the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange
fisticuffs”).
191

Cf. Harel & Parchomovsky, supra note 68, at 526 (“Just as the greater obligation of the parent to protect
her child should not be perceived as discriminatory, so too the greater obligation of the state to protect its
more vulnerable members should not be described as such.”).
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Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (“‘[G]ood faith’ on the part of a
university is ‘presumed’ absent a ‘showing to the contrary.’”) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Ca.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-319 (1978)); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 825
(“[C]ross-burning, swastikas, and the like are an especially distinctive kind of ‘fighting word’—
distinctive because of the objective and subjective harm they inflict on their victims and on society
in general. An incident of cross-burning can have large and corrosive social consequences. A
reasonable and sufficiently neutral government could decide that the same is not true for a hateful
attack on someone’s parents, union affiliation, or political convictions.”) (emphasis added).
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aggressive, exhaustive search for unconstitutional intent,193 however, did not yield
convincing results.
Although some scholars have credited the Court’s fears about viewpoint
discrimination in R.A.V.,194 a closer examination reveals them to be far less plausible.
The R.A.V. majority explained that in “practical operation,” the St. Paul ordinance would
have nefarious effects.195 The Court’s sole illustration of such effects follows:
‘[F]ighting words’ that do not themselves invoke race, color,
creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother, for
example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of
those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality,
but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents. One could
hold up a sign saying, for example, that all anti-Catholic bigots are
misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and
provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’196
Thus viewed, the ordinance would handicap one side of a debate on race, gender, or
religion, while licensing the other to “fight freestyle.”197
This argument simply does not hold up under close analysis. For starters, the vast
majority of insults would be permitted or disallowed for both sides of the debate. Hence,
an African-American civil rights advocate could not disparage white people based on
race any more than a white racist could demean African-Americans qua AfricanAmericans.198 The Court posits that in a showdown between Catholics and antiCatholics, the Catholics, in disparaging their opponents, could refer to them as “anti193

See Kagan, supra note 19, at 877 (“[T]he viewpoint discrimination found in the ordinance
existed not on its face, but only in application—and even in application, only with a fair bit of
argument.”).
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Cf., e.g., id. at 878 (suggesting that R.A.V.’s viewpoint neutrality holding has “at its core much
good sense and reason”).
195

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).

196

Id. at 392.

197

Id.
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Catholics,” but in responding, the anti-Catholics could not refer to their opponents as
“Catholics” because that would run afoul of the ordinance.199 When a speaker chooses to
attack an entire group (which, of course, is not always the case) such as “anti-Catholic
bigots,” the response is not always neatly symmetrical, as the Justices appear to think.200
This implicitly rational conception of debate is detached from the messy and sometimes
arbitrary nature of street brawls.201 Against the backdrop of an almost infinite array of
retorts targeting either an individual or a group and not necessarily tracking the original
insult, the claim that the ordinance violates the First Amendment because it requires a
hypothetical speaker who wishes to cast his insult in terms of group membership to say
“all advocates of religious tolerance” instead of “all Catholics” is a rather slender reed,
especially if one keeps in mind that the ordinance did not restrict verbal retorts at all.
Depriving one side of one particular debate of one arrow in his quiver of invectives (the
ability to create a sign expressing one specific group insult) does not even approach a
requirement that the speaker “follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”202 At most, this
measly example might support an as-applied challenge if a government ever applied a
law in such an odd fashion. The lonely hypothetical imagined by the Court surely does
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See id. at 391 (“Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for example—would
be prohibited to proponents of all views.”).
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See id. at 391-92. Even this assumption is questionable. Arguably, a reference to “anti-Catholics”
invokes religion.
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See id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s reasoning is
asymmetrical.”). Both the majority and dissent ignored the fact that the response might not track
the content of the insult. For instance, the response to an attack on all anti-Catholics could easily
be “Shut up, ugly!” or “I’m going to smack you all silly!” as it could be the Court’s posited
response.
201

Cf. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“The language of the political arena is often vituperative,
abusive, and inexact.”).

202

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392; see id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The St. Paul ordinance does not ban
all ‘hate speech’ . . . . Rather it only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words.
Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial,
religious, and gender equality.”).
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not suffice to invalidate the ordinance on its face.203 It should now be clear that the
Court’s adoption of a legal standard that establishes a First Amendment violation
whenever one side of an imaginable debate enjoys a negligible advantage tilts the speechequality analysis decidedly in favor of speech.
Just as the R.A.V. Court diluted the threshold for showing viewpoint
discrimination, the Boy Scouts Court suggested that parties may bypass
antidiscrimination laws merely by asserting a First Amendment claim. Boy Scouts
consequently abandons the pretext analysis at the heart of Roberts and central to Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence. The Boy Scouts majority’s analysis of whether one of
the Boy Scouts’ expressive goals was opposition to homosexuality was a far cry from
pretext review. After quoting a statement from the organization’s brief that it “‘teaches
that homosexual conduct is not morally straight,’”204 the Court announced that it “need
not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to
homosexuality.”205 As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, this truncated analysis took
an astoundingly deferential approach. Whereas in an earlier related case, Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,206 the Court had underscored its
“constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole,
without deference to the trial court,” in order to determine whether petitioners’ activity
was in fact protected speech,207 in Boy Scouts, the Court deferred to a position in a
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See Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is not
established by the fact that in some hypotheticals, one side has greater means of expression than
another, at least—this is the critical part—if the restriction on means has legitimate, neutral
justifications.”).
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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (quoting Brief for Petitioners 39).
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Id.
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515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).

207

Id. at 567.
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brief.208 The Court’s approach makes no attempt to sift “genuine exercises of the right to
associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate
nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand.”209 Permitting any litigant to
immunize a discriminatory decision with a mere allegation in his brief would indeed
“render civil rights legislation a nullity.”210 Recognizing the important constitutional
interest on the other side of the ledger would at a minimum require a meaningful
examination of the asserted speech interest, although, as I argue below, such an
examination need not be as stringent and invasive as Justice Stevens contemplates.
Equality considerations require a close examination of asserted First Amendment
claims in order to determine whether the claimant’s refusal to comply with
antidiscrimination laws rests on a genuine expressive interest or whether it is using the
First Amendment to obscure simple prejudice, i.e., whether the First Amendment claim is
functioning as a pretext for unlawful discrimination. For instance, in Romer, the Court
dismissed the state’s asserted non-discriminatory reasons for the constitutional
amendment uniquely disabling gays and lesbians from seeking protection from state
government. In a rather abbreviated and opaque fashion, the Romer majority concluded
that the asserted state interests were not genuine and that the law actually rested on
prejudice against gays and lesbians. The Court explained: “The primary rationale the
State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’ freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious
objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to
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Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 651.
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Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id.; see also Hutchison, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 135.
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fight discrimination against other groups.”211 Hence, the “primary rationale,”
importantly, was a First Amendment interest based on associational and religious
freedoms. Yet the Court concluded that the “breadth of the amendment is so far removed
from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”212 The lack
of fit between the state’s purported ends and means, the Court said, revealed that the
state’s justifications were incredulous.213 This rationale is peculiarly at odds with
Romer’s professed adherence to rational basis review and that minimal standard of
review’s attendant refusal to require a close fit between ends and means. A similarly
skeptical Court in the VMI case, applying intermediate scrutiny, refused to accept at face
value the state’s asserted interest in educational diversity as a justification for excluding
women from Virginia Military Institute.214 Here too there was a potential countervailing
First Amendment interest. If the University of Michigan has the constitutional authority
to promote diversity by considering the race of the students it selects, as Grutter tells us,
it is not clear why Virginia would lack the authority to promote a diverse array of
educational options, including some single-sex schools. Perhaps recognizing this
connection, the VMI Court was careful not to question the pedagogical value of
diversity,215 but it did determine that—notwithstanding Virginia’s puffery—the case was
not really about diversity. Because the state had a long and pathetic history of
discriminating against women and failed to advance its ostensible interest in diversity in
an evenhanded fashion, i.e., providing single-sex schools for men and women, the Court
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rejected Virginia’s diversity argument.216 Comparable analysis in Boy Scouts would
have required an independent evaluation of the Boy Scouts’ assertion that it had excluded
Dale because he created a genuine conflict with the group’s expressive goal, instead of
reliance on invidious stereotypes, such as the belief that gays are likely to molest young
boys.217
The Boy Scouts majority erred in diluting the standard for assessing a potential
First Amendment impairment to, at most, the equivalent of the rational basis standard,
i.e., an arguable conflict with speech suffices.218 But Justice Stevens’ analysis leans too
far in the other direction. He correctly identified the key question: “[W]hether the mere
inclusion of the person at issue would impose any serious burden, affect in any
significant way, or be a substantial restraint upon the organization’s shared goals, basic
goals, or collective effort to foster beliefs.” 219 His application of the standard, however,
displayed a troubling willingness to second-guess the Boy Scouts’ assertions of its
expressive goals. Although a number of the points in his analysis surely have merit, he
systematically picked off each piece of evidence, clearing the way for his strained,
overreaching conclusion that: “In short, Boy Scouts of America is simply silent on
homosexuality. There is no shared goal or collective effort . . . at all . . . .”220 He
entirely dismissed Policy Statements by BSA leaders stating that homosexuality was
incompatible with scouting or scout leadership because they were made after Dale
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brought suit.221 He rejected a 1978 BSA statement against homosexuality because, in his
view, it was not “unequivocal” in that it was contingent on BSA’s policy not violating the
law.222 He somehow read this statement to prevent BSA from challenging the
constitutionality of the New Jersey antidiscrimination law, and to permit it merely to seek
change through the legislative process, despite any apparent textual basis for this
distinction.223 He claimed that BSA’s policy statements that “homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and
in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed”224 was beside the point because
the Scouts never proved that Dale engaged in homosexual conduct, even though it
requires no imagination to conclude that an “avowed” homosexual has likely engaged in
homosexual conduct of some sort. He turned BSA’s words against the organization,
arguing, among other things, that its policy of referring Scouts to religious leaders was
inconsistent with any anti-homosexuality policy because some religions permit
homosexuality.225 Finally, he claimed that BSA “abandoned” its 1991 and 1992
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repudiations of homosexuality as inconsistent with its expressive goals when it issued a
1993 statement stating the following:
The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the
expectations that Scouting families have had for the
organization. We do not believe that homosexuals provide
a role model consistent with these expectations.
Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of
avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the
BSA.226
Justice Stevens read the 1993 statement to fail because it (1) did not reiterate the
points made in the 1991 and 1992 statements (thus, he deemed them “abandoned”); and
(2) because the 1993 statement relied on members’ “expectations” of the organization,
which he understood as a code word for discrimination instead of a genuine concern for
the organization’s expressive goals. His take on the ambiguous 1993 statement certainly
does not follow inevitably from the text. Indeed, Justice Stevens’ rush to find
contradictions and abandonment of past positions reveals his heavy-handed approach to
BSA’s First Amendment claim. In the end, one senses that it would have been much
simpler, cleaner and respectful of speaker autonomy for him to concede an intrusion on
BSA’s expressive interest, but find that it was slight (because there was no evidence that
Dale had ever contravened BSA’s view of homosexuality by advocating homosexuality
in his scouting activities and his mere presence in the Scouts did not by itself convey a
message of any significance) and ultimately justified by Dale’s countervailing equality
interest.
Justice Stevens’ intensive parsing of the Boy Scouts’ evidence would condition
the right to association on a consistent record of clearly expressing the asserted idea.227
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Such a requirement is inconsistent with the manner in which real people, and by
extension organizations, formulate their thoughts and ideas.228 In many instances, a
person’s thoughts evolve over time and, as her thoughts change, so does her expression.
Further, much expression is spontaneous and instinctual. Since any organization is an
association of multiple individuals whose views will inevitably diverge to some extent,
demanding perfect clarity and consistency in adhering to an ideal would seem to defeat
most associational claims. An organization should not have to cultivate a perfectly
consistent record of expression over many years—a type of constitutional “due
diligence”—before the Court will recognize its right to take a particular expressive
position.229 The right to associate for specific purposes and exclude those who would
undermine such purposes ought not be limited to the Ku Klux Klan and groups whose
views have been similarly vociferously expressed, notorious and historically consistent.
Courts certainly should not take claims of expressive interests at face value, as did the
Boy Scouts majority, but they need not subject such claims to the withering scrutiny
adopted by the dissent. The proportionate approach, by contrast, employs an
intermediate level of scrutiny, a standard that is better suited to balancing the competing
interests in the speech-equality equation.230
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In light of Bowers, and its somewhat similar doctrinal gymnastics, it is tempting
to dismiss the Boy Scouts majority’s distortion of Roberts as another indication of the
Court’s devaluation of the strong claim to equality that gays and lesbians should enjoy
under our Constitution. Yet after Lawrence v. Texas’ recent overruling of Bowers and—
just as importantly—its eloquent and expansive endorsement of gay equality, this
interpretation seems less tenable. A more nuanced explanation is that despite the
Justices’ increasing willingness to protect gays and lesbians from adverse treatment that
they view as illegitimate, such claims do not yet enjoy sufficient force to overcome the
talismanic invocation of the First Amendment that some like Justice Kennedy (author of
Lawrence and Romer, yet also a member of the Boy Scouts’ majority) have a hard time
resisting. Had Dale’s equality interest not run up against a privileged First Amendment
claim, the majority might have been able to see the discrimination lurking beneath the
facade of a speech claim.
A final observation relates to the Court’s treatment of context in R.A.V. and Boy
Scouts. In this respect, the two cases differ considerably but both disappoint. As I have
said, the R.A.V. Court deemed the St. Paul ordinance an instance of viewpoint
discrimination, which it suggested reflected “the desire of the ‘ins’ to exert their political
muscle by harming the ‘outs.’”231 In reaching this conclusion, the Court distorted the
context in which the St. Paul ordinance was enacted in a manner that reveals a tin ear
indifferent to the cries of people on the bottom.232 The outsider of concern to the Court
is the political minority—the bigot whose views purportedly have relegated him to the

regulation should not be understood literally). Justice Stevens also wisely challenged the majority’s First
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fringes of a newly tolerant social milieu—not racial minorities.233 The process theory of
equal protection review, championed by John Hart Ely234 and signified by the Carolene
Products footnote four, seeks to protect political minorities, but not the occasional
political loser, such as the racist in R.A.V. Although a white male may lose out when the
city passes a hate crime ordinance, he is more likely to be in the majority on many other
issues. As a member of the dominant race and gender, he is not subject to the “empathy
failure” that frequently blocks attempts by people of color, women and gays and lesbians
to form majority coalitions. Moreover, while outright appeals to racial hatred may
marginalize the racist in political discourse, our political history suggests that he might
enjoy considerable success with more subtle and strategic efforts to use race as a wedge
issue. This equality perspective shows that, contrary to the Court’s suggestion,235 racists
are “not anti-orthodoxy in any sense that incorporates the history and dynamics of race in
the United States.”236 Although formal equality now enjoys societal consensus, this
consensus, like formal equality itself, is skin deep. People of color, although approaching
majority status in a handful of regions in this country, are many miles from harnessing
the type of political power that might warrant deeming them an overweening majority
and thus require judicial intervention to protect their disadvantaged opponents. Viewed
in its proper context, the St. Paul ordinance is useful, but a mere drop in the bucket
233
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toward eliminating the structural and material inequalities that persist despite the modest
success of the civil rights movement. The Court’s allegiance to the ostensible “political
minority” in R.A.V. demonstrates both that judges may fall prey to the same “empathy
failure” that the Equal Protection Clause charges them with averting in the legislatures237
and that acknowledging the equality underpinnings of the St. Paul ordinance might have
helped the Court avoid this pitfall in its First Amendment analysis.
Just as it exaggerated the viewpoint discriminatory effects of the ordinance, the
Court downplayed the persistent inequities that equality-based laws seek to redress. The
Court pejoratively suggested that the hate crime ordinance represented nothing more than
group “favoritism,”238 much as Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Romer that laws
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians are “special” protections or
preferences.239 This decontexualized perspective fails to consider that such laws
counteract past and present discrimination; they are not gratuitous patronage handed out
by government solely for political purposes. This familiar technique, whether employed
against gays and lesbians or African-Americans, hinges on erasing the reality of
discrimination against particular outgroups and then positing that any deviation from the
supposed neutral baseline, such as a hate speech law, is “special,” i.e., unwarranted and
unfair. As Cheryl Harris has written:
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The law masks what is chosen as natural; it obscures the
consequences of social selection as inevitable. The result is that
distortions in social relations are immunized from truly effective
intervention, because the existing inequities are obscured and
rendered nearly invisible. The existing state of affairs is
considered neutral and fair, however unequal and unjust it is in
substance.240
The denial of specific protection to groups that are not covered by hate speech
laws (such as union members) is unlikely to demonstrate that such groups are true
political outsiders. Instead, it normally reflects the fact that unprotected groups have not
experienced discrimination tantamount to that experienced by protected groups.
Government is not doling out favors based on political preferences but rather is
responding to real problems. Where it reasonably fails to see a problem, it need not
regulate. “States adopt laws to address the problems that confront them. The First
Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.”241 The
Court was able to see R.A.V. as an instance of “censorship in its purest form”242 because
it had shorn the case of its equality dimension, including outsider personal experiences243
and the virulent impact of the burning cross that would later form the basis for the
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Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black.244 Only by overlooking the historical patterns of
discrimination, which are central in equal protection analysis,245 and which explain the
distinction between protected and unprotected groups, could the Court portray the St.
Paul ordinance as perverse.
In the Boy Scouts case, the Court was more attentive to context, but its analysis
was superficial. Its passive reflection of societal prejudice in evaluating the social
meaning of gay presence and the expressive function of “coming out” created tension
with the Court’s equality jurisprudence. The Court concluded that “Dale’s presence in
the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to
the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior.”246 The Court did not claim that Dale had engaged in gay
advocacy directed at scouts or anyone else during Boy Scouts activities, would do so in
the future or had engaged in any flamboyant behavior revealing his sexual orientation at
such activities.247 Nonetheless, the Court analogized Dale to a person in a parade who
wears a liberatory banner,248 and the state’s attempt to force the Scouts to embrace such
an activist to the state effort invalidated by the Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston.249 There are two steps in this analysis. The
Court concluded that (1) It would be evident to the world that Dale is gay; and (2) Dale’s
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mere presence in the Scouts, as a homosexual who had come out in another context,
would indicate that the Boy Scouts approved of his sexual orientation or conduct.
It is difficult to see how Dale’s mere presence at Boy Scouts functions would
necessarily broadcast a message about homosexuality or indicate that the Boy Scouts
endorsed any such message. To some extent, the first conclusion does not resonate with
gay experience from the perspective of the “bottom.” The Court misapprehended the
complex texture and meaning of “coming out,” overlooking outsider experiences as it did
in R.A.V. As far as we know, Dale’s only public acts evincing his sexual orientation
were accepting a position as copresident of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance
and speaking out about the “the psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay
teenagers” at a Rutgers event that was covered by a newspaper.250 The newspaper
published a photograph of Dale and identified him as a leader in the student
organization.251 Unless the Court embraced the hoary stereotype of a flamboyant,
essentialized homosexual whose sexuality is incapable of being concealed,252 its
assumption of widespread knowledge must have rested on a belief that once the cat of
Dale’s sexuality was out of the bag it spread quickly throughout the community.
Although the newspaper article made it possible that people, including those in
the Boy Scouts, would learn of Dale’s sexual orientation, the effect of the publication
should not be overstated. As Kenji Yoshino has explained:
Gays can never be out and done with it; they must
continually reiterate their sexual orientation against a
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heterosexist presumption that reinstates itself at every
pause. The most damaging failure of the closet symbol is
perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person’s
disclosure of his or her homosexual orientation as a binary
constructed from the endpoints of that continuum. One is
either “out” or “closeted”: the closet with its rigid door
between the “outside” and the “inside” does not lend itself
to subtler gradations.253
Even gays and lesbians who have asserted their sexual orientation publicly may find that,
because of the strong heterosexist presumption, certain associates—straight and gay—
wrongly assume that they are heterosexual. Outing is a continual and volitional process
and one that requires delicate judgment and negotiation, including consideration of the
very real risk that speaking one’s sexual identity will lead to exclusion and alienation.254
As a result, there would be nothing unusual in Dale being openly gay in the college
context where he found support in a gay student organization but shrouding that identity
in the less hospitable environment of the Scouts.255
The Court’s finding of a First Amendment violation rests not only on an
assumption of widespread community knowledge of Dale’s sexual orientation but also on
the further assumption that the community would interpret Dale’s continued inclusion in
the Boy Scouts as signifying the Scouts’ endorsement of homosexual conduct. In
contrast to R.A.V.’s tacit erasure of the discrimination that justified the St. Paul
ordinance, this particularBoy Scouts conclusion, oddly, seems to overestimate the extent
of societal discrimination against gays. This overestimation is consistent with the Court’s
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exaggeration of the public curiosity in the sexual orientation of a non-celebrity such as
Dale, which seems implicit in its assumption that the newspaper article would lead to
Dale’s sexual orientation becoming widely known throughout the community.
As to the endorsement point, a large and unselective organization’s mere
admission of a person does not normally imply its embrace of that individual’s private
sexual conduct or ideological activity carried on outside the scope of the organization’s
auspices.256 Antidiscrimination law compels an employer to refrain from discriminating,
and any reasonable observer knows that. Ever since the civil rights movement,
employment decisions have been tightly regulated at the state and federal levels. Even if
one assumes—contrary to the normal legal presumption—a society in which the public is
unaware of basic civil rights laws, at most a reasonable observer could interpret the
employer’s or group’s failure to exclude a homosexual that engages in no homosexual
advocacy during the organization’s functions as a sign that the employer tolerates
homosexual employees. But, as many gay and lesbian people have had to learn,
tolerance—in the sense of holding your nose at or being deliberately indifferent to
someone’s personal conduct—is several steps from endorsing or celebrating that person’s
private decisions or identity.257 Thus, there must be something specifically about gay
identity or conduct that, in the Court’s mind, distinguishes it from other forms of identity
or conduct and that ultimately justified excluding Dale.
Although the Court did not articulate this point expressly, the difference appears
to be that Dale was not simply someone with a homosexual orientation but someone who
had chosen to come out of the closet and affiliate with a gay and lesbian organization. As
256
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the Court repeatedly said,258 Dale was an “avowed” homosexual. This feature of the
case—that Dale’s equality interest was deeply intertwined with his decision to speak his
identity—makes Boy Scouts a uniquely difficult case. I do not contend that the answer is
clear-cut even under the proportionate approach. Justice’s Stevens’ argument that the
Boy Scouts’ exclusion of Dale was pretextual because the Scouts did not oust straight
members who advocated gay openness and equality is not quite dispositive because a
straight member cannot “come out.” A straight Scout’s revelation of his sexual
orientation contains minimal social meaning because the expression simply confirms the
heterosexist norm. By contrast, a gay person has the option to come out, and this
expressive act undeniably adds force and meaning to the abstract advocacy of gay
openness. Therefore, the Court may have viewed coming out as a political act, as a
volitional259 statement about gay openness and equality that justified Dale’s exclusion.
Given that politically tinged comings-out are the most visible and paradigmatic, it would
not be surprising if this most expressive manner of revealing one’s sexual orientation
preoccupied the Justices.
A fuller understanding of gay and lesbian experiences again provides a response
that reveals the question to be closer than the Court may have assumed.260 Although the
term “coming out” is most commonly understood to contain political implications,261 at
its root, it need not mean anything more than telling the truth or refusing to lie about the
257
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fact of one’s orientation or romantic relationships. For some gays and lesbians, including
many in the African-American gay community, that is all it means. “Coming out” in this
sense does not entail marching in parades or becoming politically active.262 In fact, many
openly gay people would never partake in such activities because they do not understand
their sexual orientation as requiring alignment with a particular political agenda. An
intersectionality perspective tells us that a person is not simply homosexual but also, for
instance, Latino or Asian-American, man or woman, Republican or independent, Catholic
or Muslim, politically active or apolitical. These additional and overlapping group
identities often mitigate the extent to which a homosexual chooses to identify with a gay
movement that is predominantly white, male and politically liberal. Thus, saddling all
gay and lesbian people who are honest about their sexual orientation with a presumption
that they are engaged in political expression would be overbroad.
Although initially one might think that the fact that Dale was discriminated
against not solely based on his sexual orientation but also because of his choice to speak
his identity justifies his exclusion, this intuition may not be sound. The speech
component of Dale’s interest might actually buttress his claim. Clearly, the Boy Scouts
discriminated against Dale based on the content of his expression. If he had said that he
was straight, he would not have had to leave the Scouts. Further, although the Boy
Scouts invoked its right of association, Dale was being punished for associating with a
gay and lesbian campus organization, and the ultimate result of a legal rule that reinforces
the already immense pressure to remain in the closet might be a society without ACT UP
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and the Log Cabin Republicans, which would diminish pluralism.263 “Threats to ‘free
speech’ may come as readily from private power (which is itself created by public power)
as from the actions of the state.”264 Although private silencing is not normally thought to
pose a First Amendment problem,265 here the Court legitimated, reinforced and inscribed
into law the Scouts’ content-based discrimination.266 The Court was willing to recognize
Dale’s claim to equal treatment only insofar as he was willing to sacrifice his right freely
to express his sexual orientation.267 This is, in essence, a constitutional version of “Don’t
Ask; Don’t Tell.”268 Those who reject the constitutional nature of private power’s threat
to speech values may not be convinced by this argument. The claim, however, finds
support in the Court’s equality cases and in the one equality-speech case that forthrightly
balanced equality and speech, Roberts.
Whereas due process jurisprudence serves largely to reflect historically rooted
values and confirm societal consensus, the Equal Protection Clause possesses more
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See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2443 (noting how the closet “disabled gay people from forming social
and political groups”).
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Sullivan, supra note 1, at 105-06; see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 950 (1963) (discussing First Amendment concerns raised by “private
centers of power [that] have come to possess extensive authority over the welfare of their individual
members,” such as “labor unions, business associations, [and] professional societies”); see also Eskridge,
supra note 19, at 2448 (“Gay experience resists making so much of the public-private distinction.”).
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But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“There is no sanctuary in the First
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.”).
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Because there were dueling speech interests, the very formulation of the Court’s rule, which predicated
Dale’s inclusion on his remaining silent without providing any neutral justification for that decision or even
acknowledging the choice undergirding its decision, officially validated one side of a private debate. Cf.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (stating that suit between private individuals may
raise First Amendment concerns); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-15, 19-20 (1948) (concluding that
judicial enforcement of discriminatory action violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
267

See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 696 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court’s holding because “[Dale’s] openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.”).
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Cf. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment
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radical aspirations.269 Equal protection analysis does not accept social conventions as
they are but rather asks with a critical gaze whether such conventions entrench a castelike system.270 For instance, rather than acquiescing in a system that superficially
privileges women by, for example, punishing only young men who drink and drive,271 the
Court has delved into the stereotypical underpinnings of such laws and self-consciously
uprooted them.272 The same equality perspective that upset the “pedestal/cage”273 and
paved the way for Roberts calls for a skeptical view of the closet.
In many respects, the closet is the defining construct of gay identity, providing the
gateway to personal autonomy and acceptance or to furious repression and self-hatred.274
Although there are important differences, the internalized psychological damage inflicted
by the closet is not unlike the stigmatic harm that animated Brown v. Board of
Education.275 The equality argument does not dissolve merely because Dale could have
hidden his identity and instead “voluntarily” chose to come out of the closet at college.
Certainly, we would not require a Jewish person to avoid statements indicating her
religious faith in order to escape discrimination.276 Conversely, we might require a
person with a medical condition to utilize medical assistance that would mitigate the
disability rather than claim disability discrimination.277 The difference between these two
269

See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1773-74. But see Eskridge, supra note 121 (arguing
that courts have deployed due process and equal protection analysis in a more complex and compatible
manner).
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See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1773-74 (stating that Equal Protection Clause
“protects against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted”).
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See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2418-19.
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See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1999).
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scenarios is a substantive judgment about the value of religion and modern medicine,
respectively. The Boy Scouts case likewise should have forced the Court to think about
the closet and its impact on gays and lesbians and the extent to which the Justices should
legitimate a rule that coerces gays and lesbians to remain in the closet.278
Notwithstanding the damaging effects of the closet in general, a look at
the particular facts of the Boy Scouts case, which the proportionate approach
requires, may dampen the persuasive force of Dale’s claim. If Dale had been
fired from his job or if the Boy Scouts was clearly a commercial organization, his
claim would have been more closely analogous to Roberts as well as more firmly
rooted in the anti- caste principle. Dale’s reliance on the Scouts’ provision of
“important socialization skills, [a] chance to connect with peers and society
through community service, and basic outlets for fun and support” seems less
compelling to the extent such socialization is not tethered to commercial
advancement279 and there are alternatives avenues of social development for gays
and lesbians. The proportionate approach seeks to balance speech and equality in
order to preserve the pluralism and diversity of society, a First Amendment and
equality interest. In general, purely social groups would seem to be closer to the
private, protected end of the spectrum than the commercial end where First
Amendment protection is at its weakest.280 The proper holding in Boy Scouts
thus may boil down to unresolved factual questions: whether the Boy Scouts is
purely social or whether special characteristics of the Scouts distinguish it from
278

Cf. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1774.
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See Brief for Respondent at 37, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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As the Court has explained, “[d]etermining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to
enter into a particular association . . . unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship’s
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other social organizations. For instance, key factors might include the extent to
which the Boy Scouts are intertwined with government, which might heighten the
stigma of excluding gays, and the degree to which the organization is commercial
in nature or functions as an avenue to socioeconomic advancement.281 This anticaste inquiry, whatever its ultimate result, is conspicuously absent from Dale.282
At the end of the day, the Justices in the majority failed to stop and “consider
[their] potential complicity in the oppression” of the closet, which equality
considerations required them to examine.283
C. Virginia v. Black: The Court Returns to the Middle
Despite the Court’s practice of privileging speech over equality, the Court’s
recent decision in Virginia v. Black signals a return to the middle, particularly when
placed in the context of a term that saw unusual landmark victories for people of color,284
women,285 and gays and lesbians.286 Honestly facing the collision between speech and
equality, the Black Court rendered a decision substantially revising the reasoning in
R.A.V. and striving to accommodate both constitutional interests. Although

objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments.” Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 623, 620 (1984).
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See, e.g., id. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
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unfortunately it did not expressly rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, several features of
the Court’s analysis indicate that the decision represents a significant departure from the
Court’s equality-neglecting recent past.
Black represents a substantial change in approach not just for the Court but also
for some of the individual Justices who helped form the R.A.V. majority, most notably
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia. Moreover, the change appears to reflect Justice
Thomas’ decision to inject his personal experiences with racist oppression into the
Justices’ deliberative process. Whatever the precise catalyst, the resulting opinion, by
Justice O’Connor, the most centrist Justice, pays close attention to context and history
and rightly rejects the near-absolutism of R.A.V.287
Virginia v. Black arose from two separate cross burnings implicating three
different defendants. In May 1998, three people burned a cross on the yard of an
African-American family in Virginia Beach, Virginia. The cross burning was intended as
retaliation for the father James Jubilee’s complaint about defendant Richard Elliott’s
shooting firearms in Elliott’s backyard.288 Jubilee testified that, upon finding the
remains of the cross in his yard, he became extremely anxious, knowing that “a cross
burned in your yard . . . tells you that it’s just the first round.”289 A few months later,
Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on the property of a person affiliated with the Klan
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See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (warning against applying
constitutional rules “out of context” and the “concrete situations that gave rise to [the claims]”); id.
(urging courts to “carefully examin[e] the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context”). Speech also must be
assessed in its particular context. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“The meaning of any expression and the legitimacy of its regulation can only be
determined in context.”); see also TRIBE, supra note 7, at 831 (“The very notion of speech is, of
course, incomprehensible outside a cultural and social context.”).
288

See Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1542-43.
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Id. at 1543.
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in rural Virginia.290 After speeches vilifying African-Americans, Latinos and Bill and
Hillary Clinton, someone burned a cross. When a sheriff approached Black, he accepted
responsibility for the cross burning.291
Virginia prosecuted the defendants for violating its cross-burning statute, which
provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to
burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who
shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of
a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall be
prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or
group of persons.292
Both Black and Elliott were convicted by juries, but the jury instructions
in their trials differed significantly. In Black’s case, the judge instructed the jury
(over Black’s objection): “‘the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence
from which you may infer the required intent.’”293 The jury at Elliott’s trial, by
contrast, did not hear that instruction.294 The third defendant, Jonathan O’Mara,
pleaded guilty.295 A divided Virginia Supreme Court held that the state’s cross
burning statute was in conflict with R.A.V., which it considered “analytically
indistinguishable.”296
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The Supreme Court was also divided, yet in important respects it upheld
the cross burning statute. After reciting R.A.V.’s general ban on content-based
discrimination, Justice O’Connor297 went on to find that the cross-burning statute
fit into an R.A.V. exception. Pursuant to the exception for laws that are “based on
the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue ... is proscribable,”298
the Court held, “[t]he First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings
done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent
form of intimidation.”299 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the case was very similar to R.A.V. and that the
majority’s “variation” of R.A.V. was not “acceptable.”300 In both cases, Justice
Souter contended, the state was attempting to suppress ideas.301 Justice Thomas
dissented on substantially different grounds,302 which are discussed below.
A plurality of the Court ruled that the prima facie evidence provision, as
interpreted by the model jury instruction, was unconstitutional.303 This provision,
Justice O’Connor concluded, “strips away the very reason why a State may ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate . . . permit[ting] the Commonwealth to
arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer joined Justice
O’Connor in this portion of her opinion.
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Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1561 (describing the majority opinion as “treating
R.A.V.’s virulence exception in a more flexible, pragmatic manner than [R.A.V.’s] original illustrations
would suggest”).
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See id. at 1560.
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See id. at 1563 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor in this
portion of her opinion.
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itself.”304 The statute thus “ignores all the contextual factors” necessary to assess
the extent to which a cross burning is protected expression.305 It blurred the
critical distinction between cross burning intended solely as political expression
(such as at a Klan rally not in the presence of African-Americans) and the same
act directed at particular individuals such as the Jubilee family.306 Justice
O’Connor indicated that incidental offense or resentment that onlookers may
experience in seeing a Klan cross burning not intended to intimidate would not
suffice to treat the cross burning as a constitutionally-proscribable fighting
word.307 Despite her criticism of the prima facie evidence provision and the
model jury instruction, Justice O’Connor left the door open for the state courts to
cure this problem in the future, perhaps by severing the provision or construing it
differently.308 Consequently, the Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court only
as to Black (whose trial was infected with the erroneous jury instruction), but
vacated the lower court decision as to Elliott and O’Mara.309
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Id. at 1551.
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See id. Citing cross burnings depicted in films such as Mississippi Burning, the Court noted
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See id.
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See id. Justice Scalia, joined in large part by Justice Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring in
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O’Connor’s interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision and the jury instruction. See id. at
1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia concluded that Justice
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to the statute. See id. at 1555-56. Because the flaw in Black’s conviction arose from the jury
instruction and not the statute itself, Justice Scalia (unlike the plurality) would have permitted the
state to retry Black.
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In many respects, Justice O’Connor’s Black opinion reflects the principles
of Justice White’s R.A.V opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice
O’Connor joined. Whereas the R.A.V. Court said next to nothing about the
history of racism, sexism and religious discrimination and proceeded as if “we
know nothing about the origins of the practice of cross burning or about the
meaning that a burning cross carries both for those who use it and for those whom
it terrorizes,”310 Justice O’Connor in Black carefully explicated “cross burning’s
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence,”311 which is
consistent with Justice White’s opinion.312 Rather than treat the burning cross as
the subject of majority disfavor, Justice O’Connor made it plain why government
would want to ban cross burning: “From the inception of the second [Ku Klux]
Klan, cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and
messages of shared ideology,” which is “‘the faithful maintenance of White
Supremacy.’”313 The Klan used cross burnings to send messages such as “We are
here to keep the niggers out of your town,” and the threat to “cut a few throats” in
order to “shut the Jews up.”314 “These incidents of cross burning, among others,
helped prompt Virginia to enact its first version of the cross-burning statute in
1950.”315
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In light of this history, Justice O’Connor concluded, the burning cross has
“special force.”316 Its importance and virulence as a threat can be fully
understood only when placed in its proper historical context.317 In R.A.V., Justice
White, joined by Justice O’Connor, relied on history and context in arguing that
the majority misapprehended its own exception. In important respects, Justice
White’s opinion “echoes the critique made by critical race theorists.”318 He
wrote: “The ordinance falls within the first exception to the majority’s theory”
because the city has identified race, religion, and gender because of “our Nation’s
long and painful experience with discrimination.”319 The ordinance was directed
at a “class of speech that conveys an overriding message of personal injury and
imminent violence . . . a message that it at its ugliest when directed against
groups that have been the targets of discrimination.”320 Justice Stevens, who
joined part of Justice White’s opinion, added that the “cross burning in this case—
directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in their home—
was nothing more than a crude form of physical intimidation.”321 He further
castigated the majority for contradicting itself in permitting Congress to ban
threats against the President “because those threats are particularly likely to cause
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See Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2366 (“There are certain symbols and regalia
that in the context of history carry a clear message of racial supremacy, hatred, persecution, and
degradation of certain groups. The swastika, the Klan robes, the burning cross are examples—like
all signs—that have no meaning on their own, but that convey a powerful message to both the user
and the recipient of the sign in context.”).
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‘fear of violence,’ ‘disruption,’ and actual ‘violence.’”322 “Precisely this same
reasoning . . . compels the conclusion that St. Paul’s ordinance is
constitutional.”323
The Black majority corrected R.A.V.’s misapplication of the virulence
exception. Just as the Court had concluded in R.A.V. that the statute barring
threats of violence against the President came within an exception because the
reasons why threats are not protected by the First Amendment have “special
force” as applied to the President,324 the Black majority concluded that the
reasons behind a ban on cross burning similarly possess special force. Whereas
the R.A.V. majority fixated on the supposedly “nefarious” effects of the St. Paul
ordinance, the Black majority was concerned about the “pernicious” history of
cross burning.
Black disappoints, however, insofar as Justice O’Connor relied on
R.A.V.’s suggestion that government cannot protect people of color, women and
religious minorities without also protecting political partisans, union members and
others to purge the taint of content-based discrimination. This was precisely the
requirement Justice O’Connor protested in R.A.V. when she signed onto Justice
White’s opinion.325 In Black, Justice O’Connor distinguished R.A.V. by stating:
“Virginia does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward
‘one of the disfavored topics’ . . . . It does not matter whether an individual burns
322

Id. at 424.
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505 U.S. at 388-89.
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See id. at 402 (White, J. concurring in the judgment) (attacking the Court’s “First Amendment
underinclusiveness” holding); id. (stating that the majority’s perceived purported defect in St. Paul
ordinance could be cured by adding “and all other fighting words that may constitutionally be
subject to this ordinance”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion,
or because of the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union, or homosexuality.”326
Further, Justice O’Connor said, “as a factual matter it is not true that cross burners
direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial minorities.”327
This much is true. But what does it prove? The same could be said of the
St. Paul ordinance. It would ban the brandishing of a swastika aimed at a person
who appeared to be Jewish even if in fact she were not Jewish, so long as the
display aroused resentment either directly (because of a Jewish bystander) or
vicariously (the non-Jewish target being offended on behalf of Jews). Although
in both instances the laws might have occasionally protected members of
nonsuspect classes, the vast majority of people impacted by cross burning are
racial or religious minorities just as the vast majority of people protected by the
St. Paul ordinance were members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Moreover,
this clear effect was not happenstance in either case. It cannot be doubted that in
enacting its cross burning statute, Virginia was aiming at racial intimidation, not
intimidation of homosexuals or Republicans, just like the City of St. Paul. This is
326

123 S.Ct. at 1549. Justice Stevens, for one, did not buy this distinction. He concurred
separately to reiterate his and Justice White’s view from R.A.V. that a statute singling out cross
burning should be upheld “even though it does not cover other types of threatening expressive
conduct.” Id. at 1553 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Id. (emphasis added). In an effort to corroborate this conclusion, the Court cited the case of
Jubilee and tried to cast doubt on the racial motivation behind the cross burning in his yard. The
Court’s unwillingness to see the racial discrimination in front of it is perplexing. It was no mere
coincidence that Elliott and O’Mara responded to Jubilee’s perceived criticism by burning a cross,
as opposed to the sundry non-racial forms of venting their anger that were available. It is telling
that “Elliott referred to Jubilee with a racial epithet confirming Jubilee’s race.” Black v. Virginia,
262 Va. 764, 768 (2001); see also id. (“In addition to the epithet, the record is replete with
references to Jubilee’s race.”). Certainly from a victim’s perspective, an African-American who
awakes to find a cross in her yard is likely to interpret the social meaning of the cross more
gravely than a white person and experience greater distress (although a white person might be
quite upset as well). Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that certain speech expresses an “overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence . . .
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clear from its decision to single out the cross as opposed to other harmful
symbols, such as the swastika.328 No honest historical account can render the
burning cross a racially neutral symbol, and Justice O’Connor’s own opinion
militates against any attempt to do so.329 It is beyond cavil that the central
organizing principle of the Klan, and its employment of cross burning, is white
racial supremacy.330 The Klan targets the overwhelming majority of its victims
because they are viewed as either a direct or indirect threat to the Klan’s racial
ideology.331 The belief in white purity, intermingled with religious overtones, ties
together the Klan’s hatred for African-Americans and Jews. And most other
victims were either other people of color or whites who allied with AfricanAmericans or Jews.332 That other groups might be protected was incidental; it
was not the motivating force behind the Virginia law. Therefore, instead of
reifying the principle that protecting only suspect and quasi-suspect classes is
illegitimate under the First Amendment, the Court should have acknowledged that
the distinctions in both the Virginia law and the St. Paul ordinance were firmly
grounded in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Yet the Black Court failed to

a message that it at its ugliest when directed against groups that have been the targets of
discrimination.”).
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using the same techniques, and operating from many of the same motivations and dysfunctions
typically produce racist and anti-Semitic speech.”).
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acknowledge this. Although the Court’s recent actions make clear that stare
decisis does not approach an “inexorable command,”333 apparently in this case,
respect for recent precedent counseled against an outright repudiation of R.A.V.
A plausible distinction between the laws in R.A.V. and Black is that the
latter banned only cross burning whereas the St. Paul ordinance was construed to
reach all fighting words that “arouse[d] anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”334 While the St. Paul
ordinance classified speech on the basis of three categories—race, religion, and
gender—the Virginia statute homed in on a subset of expression in one or two of
those categories, race and religion. Unlike the Justices who concurred in the
judgment, however, the R.A.V. majority did not train its fire on any overbreadth
of the ordinance. To the contrary, in its view, the ordinance was too narrow in
that it isolated race, gender and religion and excluded all other traits.
Accordingly, whittling the statute down to the underlying conduct banned in
R.A.V.—cross burning—would likely not have resolved the problem as it was
described in the R.A.V. majority opinion.335
333
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though their ancestors were not enslaved? Can government exclude women, who “like blacks . . . have
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Despite the Black Court’s ostensible fidelity to R.A.V.’s generality
principle, in fact it refused to require a ban on burning allsymbols, rather than
singling out the cross. As the Black Court noted, after its grant of certiorari,
Virginia “enacted another statute designed to remedy the constitutional problems
identified by the state court. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423.01 (2002). Section
18.2-423.01 bans the burning of ‘an object’ when done ‘with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons.”336 As in Eichman, the federal flag
burning case, the legislature here clearly intended to find another, more
sophisticated means of accomplishing the same end—prohibiting cross
burning.337 The Court, however, chose not to take this facially more-neutral
alternative into account. Given the existence of the object-burning law, if the

suffered deeply entrenched and systematic status-based subordination based on physical traits fixed at
birth?” Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160. Is it constitutional to grant a Black Nationalist
carte blanche to deride white people with epithets like “cracker” and “honkey,” yet prohibit a white person
from calling an African-American a “spook” or a “monkey?” See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 12, at 180
(arguing that the law should permit a tort action if a white person calls a black man a “boy” but generally
not if a non-white person called a white person a “honkey”); Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra, at 2361-62
(same). Such a law, unlike the evenhanded St. Paul ordinance, would justify the Court’s concerns about
licensing one side of a debate to “fight freestyle.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392. Drawing on a hypothetical
analogous statute in the employment law context, would today’s Court uphold a version of Title VII that
prevented whites from firing African-Americans on the basis of race but left African-American businesses
and managers free to discriminate against white employees? The answer, in light of the Court’s history of
reifing whiteness as something akin to a property interest, see Harris, supra note 58, at 1709, seems clearly
to be “No.” Thus, the notion that “openly asymmetrical regulation of racial hate speech may be less, rather
than more, constitutionally troubling,” Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160, appears out of
step with current Equal Protection Clause doctrine.
In this article, I rely principally on the Fourteenth Amendment because of the fairness concerns
raised by denying protection to women and gays and lesbians, which would seem to follow from relying
solely on the Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment’s text, which is not limited to race,
offers a more capacious home for hate speech regulation.
336

123 S.Ct. at 1544 n.1.
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Cf. Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that viewpoint based discrimination is
afoot “when a general prohibition of intimidation is rejected in favor of a distinct proscription of
intimidation by cross burning”).

The legislature apparently latched onto a statement in the state court decision distinguishing a
cross-burning law from an object-burning law. The Virginia Supreme Court stated: “[The legislature] did
not proscribe the burning of a circle or a square because no animating message is contained in such an act.”
Black, 262 Va. at 776.
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Court had struck down the cross-burning law, there would have remained a law
for prosecuting and punishing cross burners.338 Notwithstanding this more
facially neutral option, Black upheld the cross-burning law. This decision may
reflect the Court’s recognition that a more neutral law would not as effectively
embody the community’s specific opposition to hate crime. As another opinion
by Justice O’Connor’s recently confirmed, appearances matter when it comes to
issues of race.339 Black thus grants government latitude to craft specific
protections for groups that have historically suffered discrimination without
extending the laws to cover every other type of fighting word.
In so doing, Black ultimately validates the power of symbolism and
withdraws from a strict neutrality requirement regarding racial discrimination.
The upshot of its holding is that government need not use a blunt instrument—
broad, neutral regulation— such as an “object-burning” law to attack the most
serious aspects of a problem. In R.A.V., the Court specifically rejected St. Paul’s
argument that “a general ‘fighting words’ law would not meet the city’s needs
because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that
the ‘group hatred of such speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’”340 But
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Black corrects R.A.V.’s erroneous conclusion.341
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Compare with Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2374 (discussing the “farc[e]” of anti-mask
legislation, purportedly neutral regulation which has been used to target Ku Klux Klan).
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See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2341 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. . . .’”) (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950)).
340

505 U.S. at 392 (quoting Brief for Respondent 25).

341

In this respect, Matsuda and Lawrence’s prediction that “R.A.V.’s incoherence and illogic are unlikely
to withstand the test of even a few years time,” Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 14, at 136, is correct.
Black was decided little more than a decade after R.A.V. One year after R.A.V., the Court upheld a
criminal penalty enhancement for racial bias that it deemed to be aimed at conduct, not speech. See
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AfterBlack , efforts to ban attacks on groups that have faced the most destructive
oppression need not be concealed in a bland, beige wrapper in order to elude
judicial efforts to ferret out content-based discrimination. Common sense tells us
that the category of objects (other than the cross) that are typically burned as a
means of intimidation is rather small, if not entirely empty. Because the extra
speech regulated under the “object”-burning law is basically nil, the difference
between an “object”-burning law and a cross-burning law boils down to a matter
of form. Although the government could have regulated cross burning in a more
neutral manner, Black approved narrower regulation that expressly targeted
racially harmful expression.342 This new flexibility clears the way for government
to accomplish a key primary objective in passing hate crime laws: expressing its
condemnation of the most virulent forms of oppression,343 even though R.A.V.
deemed that governmental viewpoint illegitimate.344
Because intimidating expressive conduct such as cross burning can
ordinarily be prosecuted under an array of background content-neutral laws,345 a
chief contribution of more specific hate speech regulation is to express the

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). Some scholars have understood Mitchell to chip away at
R.A.V. See Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 827 (“R.A.V. and Mitchell are very close,
and the Court did not adequately explain the difference between them.”). Under this view, Mitchell may be
a precursor of Black.
342

This preference for transparency, while laudable, is in tension with Justice O’Connor’s position in the
University of Michigan affirmative action decisions, which favors ambiguous policies that covertly
consider race over those that do so transparently. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2445-46 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
343

See Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2374 (“We know why state legislatures . . . have passed
anti-mask statutes. It is more honest, and less cynically manipulative of legal doctrine, to legislate openly
against the worst forms of racist speech, allowing ourselves to know what we know.”).
344

See 505 U.S. at 392 (criticizing St. Paul’s admitted effort to condemn “bias-motivated hatred and . . .
messages ‘based on virulent notions of racial supremacy”) (quoting 464 N.W.2d at 508, 511)).
345

See, e.g., id. at 380 & n.1 (citing Minnesota laws banning terroristic threats, arson and criminal damage
to property).
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government’s condemnation of hateful expression.346 Laws that advance equality
by condemning tools of racial hierarchy—while permitting dissenting expression
that does not take the form of fighting words—further a constitutional value of the
highest stature enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. Government should not
have to shroud its commitment to equality in a farce such as the object-burning
law.
Black is significant not just because of the Court’s bottom-line holding
and newly flexible approach to the issues, but also because of the line-up of
Justices in the Black majority. Justice Scalia, despite writing the majority opinion
in R.A.V., which appeared to foreclose hate crime regulation, and Justice
Thomas, both switched sides.
Indeed, Justice Thomas moved from one end of the spectrum to the other.
He went so far as to refuse to subject cross burning to any First Amendment
analysis and to style his opinion a dissent from Justice O’Connor opinion, which
he viewed as an unnecessary compromise. Moreover, by many accounts it was
Justice Thomas’ bold speech347 at oral argument that changed the tenor of the
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In some cases, hate crimes laws may also “relieve prosecutors, or plaintiffs, from having to establish all
the requisites of a more general offense or tort,” Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 306, or establish greater
penalties than would apply under other general laws.
347

The exchange between Justice Thomas and Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben follows:

“QUESTION: Mr. Dreeben, aren’t you understating the--the effects of--of the burning cross? This statute
was passed in what year?
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.
QUESTION: Now, it’s my understanding that we had almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the
South by the Knights of Camellia and--and the Ku Klux Klan, and this was a reign of terror and the cross
was a symbol of that reign of terror. Was--isn’t that significantly greater than intimidation or a threat?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice Thomas, because it is-QUESTION: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you’re actually understating the symbolism on--of and
the effect of the cross, the burning cross. I--I indicated, I think, in the Ohio case that the cross was not a
religious symbol and that it has--it was intended to have a virulent effect. And I--I think that what you’re
attempting to do is to fit this into our jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was
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Justices’ debate.348 Justice Thomas asserted forcefully that in light of the “100
years of lynching and activity in the South by . . . the Ku Klux Klan” that the sole
purpose of the cross was “to terrorize a population.”349 Whereas in R.A.V., the
absence of Justice Marshall—Justice Thomas’ predecessor—was “palpable,”350
and almost certainly dispositive, in Black, Justice Thomas unexpectedly did what
his predecessor would have done: “remind[] the Justices about the centrality of
the Reconstruction Amendments.”351
Justice Thomas’ highly unusual and intensely personal decision to bring to
bear his own experiences with racism vindicates critical race theory’s advocacy of
the importance of looking to individual experience and considering the victim’s
story. Justice Thomas opened his opinion with the words: “In every culture,
certain things acquire meaning beyond what outsiders can comprehend.”352 In
this sense, the Pin Point, Georgia native was an insider, and the other eight

intended to accomplish and, indeed, that it is unlike any symbol in our society.
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don’t mean to understate it, and I entirely agree with Your Honor’s description of
how the cross has been used as an instrument of intimidation against minorities in this country. That has
justified 14 States in treating it as a distinctive-QUESTION: Well, it’s--it’s actually more than minorities. There’s certain groups.
And I--I just--my fear is that the--there was no other purpose to the cross. There was no communication of
a particular message. It was intended to cause fear-MR. DREEBEN: It-QUESTION: --and to terrorize a population.” 2002 WL 31838589, at *22-24.
348

See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 188, at A1 (“During the brief minute or two that Justice Thomas
spoke, about halfway through the hourlong argument session, the other justices gave him rapt attention.
Afterward, the court’s mood appeared to have changed. While the justices had earlier appeared somewhat
doubtful of the Virginia statute’s constitutionality, they now seemed quite convinced that they would
uphold it as consistent with the First Amendment.”); Clarence Page, A Burning Cross Ignites An Issue of
Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17, 2002, at A36.
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2002 WL 31838589.
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Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160.
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Id. at 161. “[J]ustice Marshall would no doubt have insisted [that] these lessons must be pondered by
the Justices, and communicated to the people.” Id.
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Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justices were outsiders—only Justice Thomas, the Court’s sole African-American
and sole Southerner, was intimately familiar with the legacy of racial oppression
underlying Virginia’s cross burning statute.353 After years of sitting silently on
the sidelines during oral argument and seeming generally disinterested, Justice
Thomas finally learned to assert himself.354 Infusing the argument with historical
implications, he transformed a dry legal discussion, purportedly detached from
individual experience, into a visceral debate about speech and equality.
At the same time, Justice Thomas’ excessive fixation on the virulence of
the Klan cross ultimately led him astray. In concluding that the ban on cross
burning did not even raise a First Amendment issue, he inexplicably dismissed
uses of the Klan cross that are not intended to intimidate, such as those done in
the presence of only Klan members. Justice Thomas’ distaste for cross burning
and its ugly history—although entirely understandable—appears to have obscured
his ability to see the legitimate speech issue lurking beneath the putrid practice.
Although in R.A.V. he had joined an opinion reaching out to create a First
Amendment problem where previous Courts had intimated there was none,355 in
Black, he opted to jettison First Amendment analysis altogether. The symbolic,
constitutionally-protected burning cross at issue in R.A.V. over time somehow
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See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 312-13 (discussing the importance of judicial consideration of
experiences that are foreign to the particular judge); see also Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at
2374 (“Legal insiders cannot imagine a life disabled in a significant way by hate propaganda.”).
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Although Justice Thomas has gradually developed a distinct viewpoint through opinions written in the
last few years, see, e.g., Scott D. Gerber, The Strong, Silent Supreme Type, L.A.TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at
M5, the Black opinion appears to be a turning point. Not long after Black, he issued a dissent that was
even more impassioned and highly personal, if more wrongheaded. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. at
2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
355

Cf. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 127 (noting R.A.V.’s “ambitious reconceptualization
and synthesis of First Amendment doctrine”); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 104 (“[D]idn’t Justice Scalia reach
out unnecessarily in R.A.V. to condemn the government’s motives . . .?”); see also Powell, supra note 3, at
81 (discussing the “extreme lengths” to which the R.A.V. Court went to privilege free speech).
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became pure conduct to Justice Thomas. This transformation in perspective is
difficult to explain. Justice Thomas’ experiences with racial discrimination in the
South obviously predated R.A.V. If anything, after more than a decade of living
the relatively sequestered life of a Supreme Court Justice, he should have been
more insulated from virulent racial bigotry than he was when R.A.V. was decided
and he had recently and barely survived the “high tech lynching” of his
confirmation hearing. In the absence of any concrete recent experience newly
sensitizing Justice Thomas to the seriousness of cross burning, Black appears to
demonstrate an increased willingness on his part to express a voice that reflects
his distinctive racial experiences, even when that requires parting company with
his conservative brethren. Although Justice Thomas’ thoughts on cross burning
presumably are not new, only recently has he become emboldened to speak his
views and wield them to shape not just his own opinion but also the outcome of a
case.356
This emergence is highly valuable, although it does present potential
perils.357 Some may criticize it as tending to foster a perception that social groups
can obtain justice only when they are able to seat a member on the Highest
Court,358 but Justice Thomas’ idiosyncratic perspective is far too complex and
confounding to be essentialized as a “black voice” or “black vote.” The true
lesson of Justice Thomas’ emergence is that it instructs the other Justices to think
twice about residing within their own personal experiences and assumptions,
356

See Greenhouse, supra note 188, at A1.
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See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002 (suggesting
that Justice Thomas might have “hijack[ed] the argument into the murk of personal experience . . . [and]
d[one] violence to the disinterested, lucid distance necessary for justice to be achieved”).
358

See id. at A35; cf. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 313.
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which often go unstated but surely color their opinions nonetheless. Considering
and expressing one’s personal experiences, as Justice Thomas did in Black, does
not inexorably lead that Justice or others to a particular conclusion. Nor is it,
contrary to some scholars’ suggestion,359 a racial trump card or gender veto.
Rather, considering the experience of those who have actually felt discrimination
requires only serious and empathetic consideration of such persons’ experiences
and perspectives.
Although those who have experienced life on the bottom should speak
their minds, their peers should critically evaluate such opinions. This testing
sometimes may lead the speaker, as well as his peers, ultimately to abandon his
articulated opinion.360 One must be vigilant to ensure that in reflecting on his
own personal experiences he is not blinded by them.361 A judge might rule
contrary to his initial impression and the apparent interests of his group because
of ultimate, overriding principles that transcend his individualistic experience. By
stripping away the deceptive veneer of detached neutrality that veils the personal
value judgments behind many judicial opinions, the proportionate approach leads
to a fuller, more concrete and deliberative process that is appropriately selfconscious.
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Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 308-09 & n.201 (discussing Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group
Difference, 99 ETHICS, 250, 261-62 (1989)); Torrey, supra note 11, at 34 (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment “should carry more weight than earlier amendments which, after all, were written by a few
elite, white propertied, heterosexual males”).
360

See Emerson, supra note 264, at 881 (“[A]n individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all
sides of the question, especially as presented by those who feel strongly and argue militantly for a different
view. He must consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, make full use of
different minds to sift the true from the false.”).
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Cf. Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias, supra note 97, at 525-26 (discussing the panoptic effect of racism,
which can lead a rational person of color to overestimate the prevalence of discrimination).

90

This discursive process also entails an intriguing element of trust. As
Robert Post has observed, the force of victims’ experiences “cannot be directly
experienced and hence evaluated by members of dominant groups. Its resolution
must therefore depend, to one degree or another, upon acceptance of the
representations of members of victim groups. As a practical matter, therefore,
what is called into question is not merely the truth of these representations, but
also the trust and respect with which they are received by members of dominant
groups.”362 Thus, the salience of the experiences of people on the bottom turns in
part on the credibility of the person articulating outsider experiences. In Black,
the fact that the speaker was not the NAACP or some critical race scholar writing
an amicus brief, but the stolidly conservative Clarence Thomas must have carried
greater weight in his fellow Justices’ eyes. The fact that Justice Thomas speaks
very rarely in court, apparently choosing his opportunities with great care, only
heightened the drama and the persuasive impact of his speech. In the same way,
the words of a law clerk that is a member of an outgroup might carry considerable
weight because they are spoken in the context of a potentially close and enduring
personal relationship.363 Incorporating an approach that looks to personal
experiences, if understood as just one component of constitutional analysis,
carries the promise of grounding the Justices’ lofty legal analysis in practical
reality, making the Court’s decisions both more democratic and comprehensible
to the public.
362

Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 312-13; see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 435 (discussing the
“double consciousness” of African-Americans: “We often hear racist speech when our white neighbors are
not aware of its presence.”).
363

Cf. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1753-55 (recounting conversation between a gay law
clerk applicant and a judge that had recently decided a major gay rights case but did not know the meaning
of the term “queer”).
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V. Conclusion
Unlike an approach that consistently privileges speech or equality, under
the proportionate approach, the “appropriate balance between equality and
freedom of expression may be a complex, shifting matrix that includes several
different forces . . . .”364 Although a self-contained model for resolving speechequality conflicts would be desirable, it would also necessarily be facile and
anachronistic in constitutional jurisprudence. What we can learn, however, is the
importance of resisting the temptation to privilege one constitutional provision
over another. A holistic approach to the Constitution that invests the First and
Fourteenth Amendments with equal dignity requires otherwise. In many cases, a
close look at each asserted interest, examined against the social history and
context of the claim, would reveal that one side of the equation is less substantial.
The hard cases remain, but I have attempted to show that R.A.V. and Black, when
analyzed with the proportionate approach, do not reside within the small set of
truly hard cases.
The Boy Scouts case is more difficult, in part because of factual questions
the Court chose not to explore. Even if one agrees with the result, an opinion that
recognized the equality considerations at work elsewhere in the Court’s case law
and that reflected the actual experiences of people like James Dale would be more
legitimate and deserving of respect than the terse analysis offered by the Boy
Scouts majority. Paying close attention to context and history, listening to the
experiences of the individual parties and respecting the important role that state
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equality-based laws may play in our system can help correct the Court’s lopsided
approach to equality-speech intersections.
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Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech
Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737, 749 (1993).
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